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1. Introduction 
A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if 
it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and 
well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust (Rawls 
1971:3). 
The Belfast Agreement 
On Good Friday of 1998, the British and Irish governments and eight political parties 
in Northern Ireland from across the political spectrum signed up to the Belfast 
Agreement (BA), or the Good Friday Agreement as it is often referred to as. The 
signatories recommended that the people of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic 
endorse the Agreement by referenda, something which was achieved in both 
jurisdictions on May the 22nd
Subsequent Developments 
 of that same year (Mitchell 2001:30). The Agreement 
was, if not the end of the so-called Peace Process, a significant step in the right 
direction for a society that since the outbreak of what is often called the Troubles in 
1969 had seen about 3700 dead and 40 000 injured due to political violence (numbers 
from Smyth and Hamilton 2004:18-19). Jonathan Tonge (2002:182) describes the BA 
as “the culmination of exhaustive multi-party, intergovernmental and bilateral talks” 
and that it “reflected hard bargaining among historical enemies, allied to 
compromise”. 
Though Northern Ireland has been a more peaceful place since 1998, political 
violence did not immediately cease, and criminality linked to paramilitary 
organizations and controversies surrounding decommissioning have represented 
significant problems. The main political institutions set up by the BA have been 
suspended on several occasions, and from October 2002 until May 2007 the devolved 
Assembly was permanently suspended and direct rule from London was exercised. It 
did succeed through various processes of negotiation (for a good and updated account 
see O’Kane (2007:149-180)) to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland in 
May 2007. Importantly, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which did not sign up 
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to the BA in 1998 and is now the largest party in Northern Ireland, has agreed to 
participate in devolved government together with the Irish republican Sinn Fein (SF) 
in accordance with institutional arrangements only slightly modified from the original 
form set out in the BA.1
Academic Criticism of the Agreement 
 In conclusion, near unanimous consent or at least compliance 
has been achieved on the BA as the basis for politics in Northern Ireland. That is if 
one measures consent by the electoral support for the political parties that now 
endorse power sharing. Thus, for the time being, criticizing the BA on grounds of 
workability does not seem to provide such a forceful argument. 
The challenges of implementing the BA have coincided in time with more theoretical 
and academic debates concerning the premises that the Agreement rests on and the 
principles that underlie it. Rupert Taylor (2006:217) claims in the article The Belfast 
Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: A Critique that “the Belfast 
Agreement (1998), as a consociational2
                                              
1 Paul Bew (2009:244) concludes that the political institutions currently in place in Northern Ireland “are not different in 
any meaningful sense to those established under the Belfast Agreement”. 
 settlement, rests on and promotes an ethno-
national group-based understanding of politics that is inherently illiberal – with the 
result that space for a more deliberative form of democracy around a common 
citizenship agenda is foreclosed”. Taylor (2006:218) is not mainly preoccupied with 
the problems of implementation and its causes: “The real cause for concern, however, 
is not so much that the Agreement has proved hard to implement, but rather that there 
are processes integral to consociational politics that are inimical to liberal 
democracy”. By conforming to consociational principles, he thinks that the BA 
“accepts and legitimates the two ethno-national communities – unionist and 
nationalist – reading of the conflict and seeks to promote a form of politics that treats 
them as fixed, autonomous and equally valid”. Taylor (2006:217) criticizes political 
scientists and “elite level policy makers” for accepting both such a reading of the 
2 The consociational model of democracy is a theory of democracy for divided societies, first and foremost associated with 
the works of Arend Lijphart. See in particular Lijphart (1977). 
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conflict and the conclusion that consociational institutions represent the best remedy, 
and that they also reject “a common rights-based resolution” on grounds of it being 
unrealistic. 
1.1  The Project 
While Taylor sees the Agreement as “inherently illiberal”, this project argues that 
evaluating the BA by means of a normative political approach deeply rooted in the 
political tradition of modern liberalism does not yield such a conclusion. In short, I 
will argue that a type of liberalism that bases itself on principles of equality and 
individual autonomy can be used to defend most of the Agreement’s content as liberal 
answers to the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland. An examination of the 
Northern Ireland conflict and the political history of that state supports the liberal 
credentials of the BA as its institutional arrangements address and secure the equality 
and autonomy of the people living under them better than other plausible alternatives. 
A Normative Approach to the BA 
However, the author of this project and Rupert Taylor agree on one thing concerning 
the BA, and that is the type of analysis that is most intriguing. Like Taylor, I do not 
focus on explaining the causes of success and failure in implementation, but rather on 
what the BA “rests on and promotes”. I address a debate mainly concerned with the 
nature of the content that was agreed to in the BA, and more specifically with the 
question of whether this was the content that ought to have formed the basis for the 
governance of Northern Ireland seen from a liberal perspective.  
The answers to “ought-questions” can be called normative beliefs or claims, and 
normative analysis amounts to “systematic examinations of the content of such beliefs 
and the premises on which they rest” (Malnes 1997:100, my translation). Normative 
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political theory/philosophy3
Northern Ireland and Liberal Political Theory 
 is a well established discipline as such and does not need 
a general justification for its existence if one accepts that normative questions can 
have right or wrong or at least better or worse answers. However, I do think taking a 
normative approach to a real life and fairly successful peace agreement demands, if 
not outright justification, then at least substantial clarification. A normative approach 
in such a case must, as I see it, show itself to be at least a potential contribution to 
justice and stability in the real world case of Northern Ireland. At a minimum, it must 
not contribute in making the situation worse by, for example, demanding that 
standards are met that, although desirable, nevertheless under the circumstances are 
unreasonable or unrealistic. In the next chapter, I outline an understanding of political 
theory’s role that takes these concerns seriously. 
The normative analysis or evaluation of the BA is to draw on knowledge of the 
conflict it addresses and the moral content of modern liberal political theory. Of 
course, as Rawls (2007:13) points out, there is no general agreement on what the 
central thesis of liberalism is. But as I will argue, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin 
provide in their works some of the most compelling modern versions of liberalism. 
This kind of liberalism has been termed “strongly egalitarian” (Nagel 2003:63), and 
its advocates are sometimes referred to as “’social democrats’” (G.A.Cohen quoted in 
Kymlicka 1989:10). However, no one would seriously deny that Rawls and Dworkin 
are liberal political theorists. In any case, it is mainly their type of political morality I 
seek to use as a standard for judgment on the question of the liberal credentials of the 
BA. When presenting and discussing this standard, I also draw on the contractual 
tradition in liberal theory. In this respect, T .M. Scanlon’s (1982) Contractualism and 
utilitarianism will be the main resource. 
                                              
3 As Lindensjö (1997a:200-1 and 1997b:212-14) remarks, terms like “political philosophy” and “political theory” are often 
used synonymously, and attempts to establish a coherent and rational way of separating the two, have not been very 
successful. I will use these terms interchangeably as different authors engaged in the same type of enterprise vary in the way 
they term their own work and the work of others.  
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So far so good, but as will later be discussed and argued in more detail, the Northern 
Ireland conflict gives rise to important normative questions on the drawing of political 
boundaries and especially the relations between majority and minority groups within a 
political entity. Kymlicka (1989:3) claims that the issue of minority rights has been 
completely neglected by Rawls and Dworkin. He shares, however, their basic political 
morality and has used it, as I see it, with a high degree of success to establish a liberal 
approach to minority rights (Kymlicka 1989; 1995a). It might be said that Kymlicka 
has managed to prove that Rawls actually meets the challenge Rawls himself has 
acknowledged as legitimate: 
Justice as fairness, and other liberal conceptions like it, would certainly 
be seriously defective should they lack the resources to articulate the 
political values essential to justify the legal and social institutions 
needed to secure the equality of women and minorities. (Rawls 
2001:66) 
In short, it is a type of liberalism first and foremost associated with Rawls and 
Dworkin that forms the standard of judgment on the BA’s liberal or illiberal nature. 
Kymlicka supplements this standard through his application of liberal theory to the 
issue of minority rights. But as Kymlicka (1995a:1) warns, there are no simple 
answers to conflicts, and “every dispute has its own unique history and 
circumstances” that matter to what counts as “fair and workable” solutions. My aim is 
to use the resources provided by these liberals and combine it with solid background 
knowledge of the Northern Ireland conflict. Doing that, I will argue, provides a 
defense of the Agreement as justifiable as seen from a liberal point of view in a 
Northern Ireland context. 
1.2 Research Question and Outline       
The research question in this project is short and simple: 
Is the Belfast Agreement illiberal?  
 9 
The discussion is mainly one within the liberal family of political theory, a tradition I 
count both myself and Rupert Taylor as adherents to and have briefly pointed to 
previously. The question of whether liberalism is the appropriate political morality is 
left mostly untouched, but I believe that it is inevitable that the arguments provided do 
give rise to reflections on that question as well. 
Remarks on Scope and Focus 
The BA is a substantial document both in terms of pages and what it covers. Since I 
seek to contribute to the debate on the BA concerning the type of critique provided by 
Rupert Taylor, it is necessary to focus on those aspects of the Agreement most 
relevant to this debate. However, when I later present the BA, a brief outline of the 
entire text is provided, before turning more in detail to the parts in particular focus in 
the analysis. The brief outline is meant to offer the reader a possibility to make up her 
own mind on whether my choice of focus is an appropriate one and to offer a general 
context to the specific aspects of analysis.  
Outline of the Thesis 
The introductory chapter has so far introduced the BA and a debate concerning its 
liberal credentials. The ambition to refute this charge of illiberality through normative 
analysis has been stated. In chapter two, I will establish a theoretical and 
methodological basis for the normative evaluation of the Agreement by means of 
liberal political theory and defend what I see as the core principles and content of 
liberalism. The challenges of conducting research on a society that has experienced 
conflict are also tended to. In chapter three, I provide an interpretation of the Northern 
Ireland conflict needed in order to make informed judgments on whether the BA is a 
liberal solution to it. In chapter four, I present the Agreement and go on to evaluate 
the parts relevant to the debate on its liberal or illiberal nature. Finally, in chapter five, 
I provide a summary of my conclusions that together support a label of the BA as a 
liberal and honorable settlement for Northern Ireland. I also make a few remarks on 
recent developments and the lessons that might be learned from the Northern Ireland 
approach to conflict resolution. 
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2. Methodology and Theory    
This chapter starts out with some reflections on the proper role of normative analysis 
of a political agreement in a society that has experienced serious conflict. I then turn 
to a method or technique of normative argument that is central in the works of John 
Rawls, reflective equilibrium. I try to demonstrate how this approach can be a useful 
guideline in the way one thinks of and conducts normative argument. Thereafter, an 
argument for what I see as the core moral content of modern liberalism is made in 
order to establish a standard for evaluating the liberal credentials of the BA. I start out 
with the general principles of equality and autonomy and subsequently move towards 
how these principles relate to the more specific context of societies where political 
boundaries and majority-minority relations are issues of contention. Finally, some 
challenges of conducting research on a society in conflict are discussed. 
2.1 Normative Analysis Applied to “the Real World” 
“Contemporary accounts of justice, democracy and rights can hardly avoid being read 
as programmes for action”, Margaret Canovan (1996:136-7) writes. At the same time, 
she points out that it is harder than ever before to defend a strictly utopian approach to 
political theory, either in the form of an “intellectual exercise” or an appeal to fellow 
human beings to “repent of their sins” without considering the prospects for this 
actually happening. This project seeks to evaluate a fairly successful peace agreement 
from a liberal point of view. To me it seems of great importance that this “intellectual 
exercise” does not ignore or dismiss considerations of stability and workability in its 
judgments or recommendations.  
Political Theory as “Realistically Utopian” 
John Rawls (2001:4-5) sees one of the roles that political philosophy might have as 
“realistically utopian”. It entails that it should probe “the limits of practicable political 
possibility”. Rawls (2001:13) later adds that so-called ideal theory, as expressed by 
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the realistically utopian, has a potentially important role to play when engaging in 
“nonideal theory” concerned with “difficult cases of how to deal with existing 
injustices”, in that it helps us “clarify the goal of reform” and to see which wrongs are 
the most serious and therefore our first priority to correct. The task for philosophers is 
therefore to ask and answer such questions as what a just democratic society looks 
like if we assume “reasonably favorable but still possible historical conditions, 
conditions allowed by the laws and tendencies of the social world”. This, I think, 
expresses a sensible view on the proper role of empirical insights in normative theory 
and analysis because it allows room for locating the proper goals of politics, while not 
amounting to pure wishful thinking. Indeed, a number of scholars have in various 
ways pointed to the potential benefits of empirical and normative political science 
informing each other, or more defensively put, the dangers in not informing one 
another’s projects (Shapiro 2002; Barry 2002a; Føllesdal 1996b). As I see it, political 
theory striving to be realistically utopian in this way has a good chance of securing 
such benefits and avoiding such dangers. 
“Legitimacy as Justifiability” – Bridging the Utopian and the Realistic? 
It is perhaps difficult to pinpoint exactly where the utopian and the realistic cease to 
be of relevance to one another. However, I believe that justification through 
normative argument aimed at those which something concerns can contribute to 
legitimacy and therefore to a form of acceptance and stability. Andreas Føllesdal 
(2006:441-468) provides interesting reflections on this theme when he discusses 
legitimacy in an article concerning the academic debate regarding how to approach 
the so-called “legitimacy deficit” of European integration. He introduces the concept 
of “legitimacy as justifiability”. It is a normative concept as it expresses a view on 
legitimacy that is often linked to the notion of “justifiability among political equals”, 
which means that legitimacy is “an issue of whether affected parties would have or 
could have accepted it, under appropriate choice conditions”. This clearly echoes a 
contractual view on justification, a view that is prominent in the liberal tradition. 
Furthermore, it is the degree to which justifiability can be seen as linked to 
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compliance, in that compliance can be seen as one indicator of whether people believe 
that the institutions in question are actually normatively legitimate that makes 
normative argument relevant to real world politics. I therefore see it as potentially 
meaningful to conduct a normative political analysis drawing on liberal political 
theory on the BA. It is my hope that if good enough arguments can be provided, then 
they might contribute to compliance for other reasons than “apathy, cynicism or fear”, 
and perhaps even active endorsement of political arrangements. If I succeed, is of 
course up to the reader to judge. But being realistically utopian and trying through 
normative argument to offer good reasons for the BA’s legitimacy, as seen from 
within liberal theory, forms the rationale behind this project’s approach.  
2.2 Reflective Equilibrium and Justification 
It is worth noting from the outset that both the epistemological status of moral 
statements and the question of normative method are not subject to any widespread 
agreement (Semb 2000:12). I will not go in depth on whether normative statements 
can in fact be true or what that actually entails, but rather focus on how one can go 
about in the process of justification within the field of normative political theory. 
Introducing the Method 
The method of reflective equilibrium has been used and advocated as a “coherence 
account of justification” in various areas of inquiry such as inductive and deductive 
logic, ethics and political philosophy (Daniels 2003 [online]). In its most basic form, 
the idea is that when our considered judgments or convictions about something do not 
fit with the implications of a normative principle, we are to move back and forth 
between the two levels (principle and judgment) adjusting and modifying at both 
levels until reflective equilibrium has been reached (Semb 2000:19). The method is a 
central part of Rawls’ approach to justification in his works (Scanlon 2003:139-167). 
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What to Make of Our Beliefs on Justice  
Rawls (1971:46) assumes that under normal circumstances persons develop “a sense 
of justice”, which is a skill of “judging things to be just and unjust, and in supporting 
these judgments by reasons”. I believe most people daily make judgments on what 
they believe to be just and unjust, and that in many cases reasons are brought forward 
supporting these judgments. But how should one perceive the status of these various 
judgments people make? In the philosophical literature, there are views concerning 
our normative judgments or “beliefs” that range from them being “direct perceptions 
of some independent and objective moral facts” to them simply being “subjective 
preferences” (Dworkin 1977:159).  
Accepting the latter view renders it meaningless to treat some normative beliefs or 
judgments as having the potential to be any more relevant or correct than any others in 
relation to just institutions (Malnes 1997:102). Accepting the former view might 
compel us to make metaphysical commitments that might be hard to defend. 
However, the idea of reflective equilibrium provides a “middle ground” where one 
can avoid having to state whether one adheres to some form of ethical realism or 
subjective preference view on what moral beliefs are about. This is because 
“justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything 
fitting together into one coherent view” (Rawls 1971:21).  
Considering the purpose of most political theory, and more specifically this project, 
the task is not primarily seeking to establish objective moral truth, but rather the more 
practical aim of deciding which political institutions one should prefer when 
confronted with a limited set of alternatives. This does not deny the possibility that 
there is some solution to the Northern Ireland conflict that amounts to the best 
solution there is. In this project, however, I simply stick to a more modest enterprise 
of making judgments on the BA and some plausible alternatives based on the best 
reasons that can be provided at the moment of decision. Indeed, Rawls and 
“methodological Rawlsians” seldom clarify which if any “‘deep’ epistemological 
theories of justification” they adhere to (Norman 1998:280), probably because the 
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procedure of reflective equilibrium does not assume that there is one correct moral 
conception” (Rawls 1999a:289-90). It only requires that one revises with “conviction 
and confidence” judgments that we believe are inconsistent with principles that are 
compelling, and continue “to affirm these principles when it comes to accepting their 
consequences in practice” (Rawls 1999a:289). 
Remarks on Considered Convictions or Judgments 
There are aspects to keep in mind when it comes to the reliability of the moral 
judgments one makes. Rawls (2001:29) understands “considered convictions” or 
“considered judgments” as judgments that are made under the most favorable 
conditions possible for using “our powers of reason and sense of justice”. Therefore, 
judgments made when for example emotionally unstable or when there are strong 
personal interests in a specific outcome should not be counted as considered 
judgments as well as the obvious cases of judgments that are made hesitantly or with 
little confidence (Rawls 1971:47). Norman Daniels (1979:258) also emphasizes the 
importance of having adequate information about what is being judged in the process 
of designating judgments as considered. I think this last point is especially relevant 
for this project, and it forms the rationale behind the chapter interpreting the Northern 
Ireland conflict.          
Reflective Equilibrium – Narrow and Wide 
The basic form of the method of reflective equilibrium only entails what is called a 
“narrow reflective equilibrium”. The reason is that only inconsistencies between a set 
of considered judgments and a certain principle or principles are sorted out (Daniels 
1979:258; Rawls 2001:30-31). Being consistent is of course in itself something to 
strive towards, but when conducting a normative analysis one should seek to bring as 
many reasons as one can to support arguments and submit them to challenges from 
alternative views. It is in this respect the method of wide reflective equilibrium seems 
more promising than the notion of a narrow reflective equilibrium.  
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This method, according to Daniels (1979:258), “is an attempt to produce coherence in 
an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a) a set of 
considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant 
background theories”. One therefore goes beyond mere consistency between and 
among principles and judgments if one for example can use the theories (c) to show 
that the principles (b) are better than alternative sets of principles by reasons that are 
somewhat independent of (b)’s fit with the considered moral judgments (a). It is, 
however, a precondition that the relevant background theories offer such independent 
support for there to be any improvement in the justification of a principle in contrast 
to narrow equilibrium where (c) is not in the picture at all (Daniels 1979:259). 
Daniels (ibid.) suggests that a way to show that such support from background 
theories is independent and that the theories are not just “accidental generalizations of 
the considered judgments” is to make sure that the background theories are not just 
“reformulations of the same set of considered moral judgments involved when the 
principles are matched to moral judgments”. Semb (2000:21) believes that providing 
such independent support for a moral/normative principle gives us more reasons to 
accept it, and furthermore that it is a strength that these reasons are at different levels 
of generality. It is difficult to disagree with this conclusion, and as far as the limits 
within which this project must confine itself allow for using reasons from different 
levels of generality, it is an ideal that will be followed. 
Rawls and Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
To demonstrate with a more concrete example the difference between narrow and 
wide reflective equilibrium Rawls is a good case in point. Rawls (2001:31) points to 
the reaching of narrow reflective equilibrium as a process where one merely has 
looked (in his case) for the conception of justice “that called for the fewest revisions 
to achieve consistency”. Wide equilibrium is for him reached when alternative 
conceptions of justice, and the arguments for them, have been thoroughly considered 
before all judgments on all levels of generality are then brought in line with each 
other. This process has submitted the conception of justice to potentially many 
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revisions and gone through a broad process of reflection. Rawls (1971:49-50) does 
admit that it would be near impossible to examine all potential alternative conceptions 
of justice and the arguments for them even if one knew of them all (which is also 
open to doubt), but he suggests and employs a strategy of studying and considering 
those conceptions that are well known in the philosophical tradition in addition to 
those who occur to one in the process. Through such an approach, Rawls holds that 
his “justice as fairness” can be understood as defending that his two principles would 
be preferred in the original position to the alternative conceptions of justice like utility 
and perfection; “and that these principles give a better match with our considered 
judgments on reflection” than the alternatives. His conclusion is therefore that “justice 
as fairness” brings one closer to the ideal of wide reflective equilibrium. Daniels 
(2003 [online]) remarks that Rawls in seeking wide reflective equilibrium has in the 
process responded to “considerable critical pressures on the original beliefs” through 
“searching deliberation about what is right”. T. M. Scanlon (2003) clearly lends 
support to such an interpretation of the method and Rawls’ use of it, namely a 
deliberative one. I take deliberation to be a mode of reasoning that is particularly open 
to taking many considerations and perspectives into account and giving them a fair 
hearing. I think such an approach improves analysis of difficult normative questions.  
Cautionary Remarks 
I am not, however, claiming that I will achieve wide reflective equilibrium among all 
my beliefs at all levels of generality on just or legitimate solutions to conflicts in 
divided societies or Northern Ireland specifically. It is attempting to follow the logic 
and insights of such a method that is of value. I therefore expect that drawing on the 
method will improve the way I will argue in favor of certain principles and judgments 
at the expense of alternatives, and thus lead to a more well-supported answer to the 
research question. Ideally, one should hope to arrive at a point similar to Daniels’ 
(2003 [online]) description of “an optimal equilibrium”, that is “when the component 
judgments, principles and theories are ones we are un-inclined to revise any further 
because together they have the highest degree of acceptability or credibility for us”. 
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As Rawls (2001:31) points out, “the most reasonable political conception for us is the 
one that best fits all our considered convictions on reflection and organizes them into 
a coherent view. At any given time, we cannot do better than that”. 
2.3 Liberalism 
In this section, I present and argue in favor of a certain type of liberalism that is later 
used as a standard for evaluating the liberal credentials of the BA. It is essentially an 
argument for a type of liberalism that I will defend as expressing what our most 
deeply held considered convictions of political justice are or should be on due 
reflection. The central ideas used are from the works of Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon and 
Kymlicka, but other theorists are on occasion drawn on. I also introduce a contractual 
perspective because it is a useful tool often used in liberal theory to bring out and 
refine liberal political morality. Towards the end of this section, the issues particularly 
relevant to political boundaries and majority-minority relations are discussed. 
Liberalism in My Own Words 
I start out with what I see as the main characteristics of the liberal view that will be 
elaborated on in the following sections. In the subsequent arguments underpinning 
and specifying it, the people to whom I am intellectually indebted for my views are 
given due credit and reference. In my view, the normative starting point of all 
questions political has to be the people who are affected by political decisions and 
thus their interests have to be taken into account. Any plausible account of political 
theory with that starting point also has to recognize that these people should be seen 
as, and accordingly treated as, equals. Seeing members of a political community as 
equals and their interests as the focus of politics should lead one to see the purpose of 
political arrangements as one of enabling each individual member of society to pursue 
a course in life that he or she deems as meaningful as long as this does not involve 
violating other people’s status as equals. Together with the political community’s 
responsibility for such enabling of each member comes a corresponding demand on 
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each individual to take responsibility for the choices made within that societal 
framework. I believe this general view expresses the core of the most promising 
strands of liberal political theory. 
Why People Should Be the Starting Point and Focus of the Political 
The best argument for claiming that politics should be about the people whom politics 
affects is the absurdity of trying to deny that it should be so. Ronald Dworkin 
(1983:33) captures this neatly by stating that when people are invited to participate in 
politics, it is done on the premise that in politics it matters what happens to those 
“whose politics it is”, and it would not make sense for anyone to accept an invitation 
if this premise was not implied. Of course, this does not mean that politics is an 
enterprise which is always characterized by this feature, but when making normative 
arguments for or against a political course of action or regime, Dworkin’s point is 
hard to argue against. No one would willingly participate in a joint venture if that 
project had no regard for one’s most fundamental interests. What happens in 
someone’s life is undoubtedly one such fundamental interest for all human beings. 
The fact is that historically those movements that have fought for democracy have 
done so by advocating a principle of popular control together with political equality 
(Beetham 1999:6). I think this illustrates the deeply held conviction in democratic 
thought that people cannot be ignored in politics. Popular control simply makes it 
more difficult to disregard people’s interests. One could say that democrats, if not 
properly invited to politics, have sought to write the appropriate invitation themselves. 
Why Political Equality Is a Basic Principle 
Accepting as settled that in politics it should matter what happens to those “whose 
politics it is” does not by itself explain or establish a principle of viewing and treating 
all members of a political community as equals. It is logically possible to imagine a 
political decision or institution being grounded on concern with what happens to the 
members of the political community, but at the same time applying criteria that 
distinguish between the members as to what degree concern is given. Consider as an 
example the old system of local council elections in Northern Ireland where only 
 19 
home owning ratepayers could vote, thus excluding about 300 000 citizens from this 
part of the franchise, while still allowing them to vote in Stormont and Westminster 
elections (Tonge 2002:21).  
However, if one is to take the normative idea of democracy seriously, it is hard to 
imagine any justification for a political system that does not in some meaningful sense 
of the word regard citizens as equals within it. Democracy itself should not be seen as 
a contested concept even though there are many different political systems in the 
world that probably all could be labeled democracies. It is the principles of popular 
control and political equality that define the concept of democracy, and institutions 
are thus only democratic to the degree that they realize those principles in a given 
context (Beetham 1999:4-5). The fact that few would admit to have beliefs contrary to 
at least an abstract notion of equality, “equal concern and respect” (Dworkin 
1985:191), I think demonstrates equality’s position as a principle most would have 
trouble rejecting as fundamental to their political morality. 
Therefore, I think it is uncontroversial when Rawls (2001:19) grounds his 
“conception of the person” as free and equal in “the way citizens are regarded in the 
public political culture of a democratic society”. He simply states what democrats 
believe the citizen should properly be seen as. The natural conclusion is that if a 
political theory accepts democracy as a fundamental principle, something I submit it 
must for anyone’s plausible allegiance to it, political equality becomes a necessary 
part of that theory. Many or perhaps most theories actually include such a premise, 
but rather disagree on its specific implications. Dworkin (1983:24-5) has suggested 
that many and diverse political theories can be and have been presented as based on 
what he calls “the abstract egalitarian thesis”. It holds that “from the standpoint of 
politics, the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally”. 
The challenge is to fill this commitment with more specific content. 
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The People’s Politics and Equality in Contractualism 
I believe the following general and classical statement of how contractualism can 
perceive moral wrongness is well suited to demonstrate contractualism’s commitment 
to the abstract egalitarian thesis as well providing a path towards specifying liberal 
political implications: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of 
behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement (Scanlon 1982:110). 
Applied to political argument this account clearly secures that the focus of politics is 
on the interests of those living under political institutions through the fact that an 
argument that gave a person’s well-being no weight could reasonably be rejected by 
that person (Scanlon 1982:119). No agreement can be considered morally binding if it 
can be rejected on such clearly reasonable grounds. People’s status as equals is also 
built into such contractualism for two reasons. First, because everyone is given a veto 
on agreement it makes them equals in this respect. Second, the agreement must be 
“unforced”, meaning that coercion is unacceptable and that no one can be forced to 
accept a proposal for agreement due to an inferior bargaining position (Scanlon 
1982:111). Most people’s moral convictions clearly rule out straightforward coercion 
as acceptable when proposing mutually binding political structures. However, I 
submit that most have equally strong beliefs that rule out the more subtle coercion that 
can be applied to those in a weaker bargaining position. As Rawls (1971:141) puts it, 
“to each according to his threat advantage is not a principle of justice”. Ruling out 
coercion in these two forms would eliminate some of the most significant sources of 
inequality that exist in real world political systems. Thus, it should accordingly be an 
important principle underpinning normative political argument.  
Comparability of the Impact on the Interests of Individuals 
Contractualism, as argued, incorporates the fundamental principles defended so far. In 
addition, it points to another feature of moral argument. Since contractualist morality 
relies heavily on “what it would be reasonable to accept, or reasonable to reject,” 
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some system of comparability becomes necessary to make such judgments meaningful 
(Scanlon 1982:113-14). Applied to a political context, Føllesdal (1996a:62-3), 
following the contractualism of Scanlon (1982),4
How Do Interests Count? A Matter of Moral Argument Itself 
 holds that “liberal contractualism 
takes as its subject alternative rules and practices, and seeks to assess them by means 
of their impact on individuals’ interests”, that is, of the individuals affected by those 
rules or practices. Obviously, the need for comparing such impact is necessary if a 
meaningful judgment on the reasonableness of rejecting a principle, institution, or a 
set of such, is to be made. To illustrate, surely if a principle assigns a burden to a 
person, it would still be unreasonable for that person to reject it if all alternative 
principles would assign much greater burdens on others (Scanlon 1982:111). 
Comparability is a necessary part of moral argument in politics that assesses 
reasonableness. 
Assessing and comparing the impact on individuals’ interests is not enough when 
arguing for or against political institutions or principles. One must also have an 
accompanying account of what interests people have as well as judgments on how 
much and how these interests should count in arguments on reasonableness. The 
substantial question of what interests people have will be addressed presently, but 
first a few general remarks are in order about how exactly interests are perceived and 
weighed in contractualist moral argument. Contractualism of the kind discussed here 
would, as stated above, reject an argument that gave a person’s well-being (certainly 
an important interest) no weight because it could reasonably be rejected by that 
person. However, it does not follow that a person is justified in doing something (or 
proposing political institutions that would allow her to do so) in order to satisfy an 
interest in well-being by appealing to the “intensity” of the desire to satisfy that 
interest (Scanlon 1982:119).  
                                              
4 Føllesdal (1996:62 and 81n12) also cites Rawls (1971) and Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press (1989) as advocates of such contractualism. 
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Clearly, most people’s desire for ice-cream does not warrant government subsidies for 
ice-cream no matter the intensity of desire involved. Other forms of government 
subsidies would on the other hand be accepted by many or most in many cases where 
there is neither no intense desire nor many who share that desire involved, even if 
such subsidies come at the expense of ice-cream subsidies. What matters are interests 
that others can accept that another person has a legitimate interest in, or to be more 
precise, what matters are claims that could not be reasonably rejected by others. To be 
able to decide what this entails the weight that an interest has in moral argument must 
be based on “a conception of morally legitimate interests”, and that conception must 
itself be a product of moral argument (ibid.). What a contractual approach to politics 
must do then is to provide a suitable index that can define and demonstrate what kind 
of interests that can reasonably be considered as relevant (Føllesdal 1996a:63-4), as 
well as determining the weight they should have in political argument. In the 
following, it is argued that the most important interest that people have which should 
also be mutually recognized as a valid ground for claims on political institutions leads 
one to liberal conclusions on legitimate political institutions. It does so because of the 
role that particular interest assigns to a certain interpretation of the interest people 
have in autonomy.  
Establishing the Role of the Interest in Autonomy in Justifying Political 
Institutions 
The starting point is a claim that one particular interest is the most important for all 
people. I would also hold that not only is it the most important interest we have as 
human beings, it is also an interest that it would be unreasonable to reject as a basis 
for any person to make claims on the form political institutions should take. The 
interest in mind is that of “leading a good life” (Kymlicka 1989:10) or “having as 
good a life as possible” (Dworkin 1983:26). As human beings, the good life is 
something we have beliefs about, reflect on what it consists of, and we plan and act 
on how to achieve it. Rawls (2001:18-19) describes it as a moral power that at least 
citizens of a modern democracy can be thought to have, that is, “to have, to revise, 
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and rationally to pursue” projects in life based on what we believe would achieve a 
good life. “The capacity for a conception of the good”, he calls it.   
Leading a good life, however, must be distinguished from simply “leading the life we 
currently believe to be good” because we must admit that what we currently deem as 
worthwhile and valuable life projects very well might be based on false premises or 
judgments. That this is the case is demonstrated by our continued reflections in life at 
important crossroads even when we can predict the outcome of particular choices in 
that situation. What troubles us in those situations and make us reflect is the 
possibility of the project pursued being the wrong one, not simply a calculation of the 
best route to fulfilling the goals of that particular project. This can only mean that 
“our essential interest is in having a good life, not the life we currently believe to be 
good” (Kymlicka 1989:10-11). 
But why should political institutions secure individual autonomy if people’s essential 
interest is in having a good life, something they very well may be mistaken about how 
to achieve? Would it not be reasonable to reject claims for autonomy by people who 
are clearly pursuing misguided projects? It would seem more logical (if still sticking 
to equality) to advocate what Dworkin (1983:28) labels “the totalitarian concept of 
equality”, meaning that government should aim at people having genuinely good lives 
without regards to each person’s own view on the life she is forced to live. Is then a 
liberal like Rawls (1999b:283) denying that having a genuinely good life is a person’s 
most fundamental interest when he maintains that “justice as fairness” views 
individuals “as beings that have a capacity for forming, adopting, and changing” plans 
for life, and that they “give priority to preserving their liberty in these matters”, and 
when he goes on to claim that “people are assumed to have a highest-order interest in 
how all their other interests, even their fundamental ones, are shaped and regulated by 
social institutions”? At least he is denying that it as a good idea that government or 
anybody else for that matter, encroach into or take over their reasoning about and 
pursuit of the good life.  
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There are several reasons for rejecting such paternalism as serving the fundamental 
interest of having a genuinely good life. One is that just as any individual can be 
mistaken about the good life, so can government. Consider also the problem of 
finding an appropriate procedure to decide what the government’s favored view on 
the good life should consist of. The main argument against paternalism, however, 
holds even if government really did know and was able to adopt and enforce/promote 
the correct view on the good through its political institutions. That argument is that it 
is only possible to pursue the interest of having a genuinely good life if it corresponds 
with people’s own beliefs “about what kind of life is good” (Dworkin 1983:28). With 
this “endorsement constraint” (Dworkin 1983:29) in place, paternalism simply does 
not serve people’s most important interest because this interest cannot be satisfied by 
outside intervention, so to speak. To illustrate the point, a hypothetical Northern 
Ireland example can be used. For argument’s sake, assume that Greek Orthodox 
Christianity is the religion that actually provides the best way for all in Northern 
Ireland to live genuinely good lives. Accordingly, the government forces all citizens 
to participate in the practices of that confession. Would that make any individual who 
genuinely believes in the Protestant or Catholic variety of Christianity, or any other 
religious or moral doctrine other than the state’s confession, have a better life?5
Individual autonomy seems after all to have a role in the pursuit of the genuinely good 
life, and the interest in having such a life might be reformulated as really one of 
getting beliefs about value right and then acting on them (Kymlicka 1989:13). 
However, such an interpretation points to a multifaceted concept of individual 
autonomy as relevant to serving the interest of having a good life. I believe three 
aspects can be identified. First, it is required that people are free and able to pursue 
the course in life they at present believe to be the best one because any life project 
must be endorsed by the person embarking on it in order make her better off. Second, 
 The 
answer is obviously no. 
                                              
5 A similar example used by many liberals is one of praying, which may be a valuable thing to do, but it requires that a 
person thinks it is worthwhile (Kymlicka 1989:12 and 19n2). 
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because people can be moved by reflection or other factors to change their beliefs, the 
same freedom and opportunity must apply after such revision. These two aspects by 
themselves would justify claims to a number of rights, liberties and opportunities in a 
political system. But since the essential interest also includes getting one’s beliefs 
right, all factors that influence people’s reflection on the good life become a matter of 
importance to them. Thus, the range of options available and known to people and 
whether they are given the opportunity to examine these intelligently are relevant 
concerns (Kymlicka 1989:13; 18-19).  
In this light, the claims that were attributed to Rawls (1999b:283) above start making 
more sense. People have a “highest-order interest” in how all their other interests are 
shaped and regulated by social institutions, and the exercise of the capacity for a 
conception of the good (all aspects of it) is an activity in which it is essential to 
preserve one’s liberty. One should of course recognize that the “highest-order 
interest” is fundamentally one in having a genuinely good life and not the capacity for 
a conception of the good and the things that influence it (Dworkin 1983:26), but these 
interests are, as hopefully made clear above, intimately linked, and I see no reasons of 
substance to criticize Rawls for his choice of words. 
A Brief Outline of Institutional Principles and Structures for a Liberal State 
Giving a complete account of principles and structures for a liberal state that 
perceives its citizens and their interests as argued above would amount to an entire 
project or even several projects. Nevertheless, some brief comments are needed. Such 
a state would certainly secure a specific list of liberties, basic rights and opportunities 
for each citizen, and securing in this context means that an individual is to have these 
even if arguments of the general good or perfectionist ideals come into conflict with 
them (Rawls:2005:6).6
                                              
6 It would of course be interesting and appropriate in line with the idea of wide reflective equilibrium to confront this liberal 
principle of priority against utilitarian and perfectionist alternatives. However, for the purposes of this project, Rawls’ 
(1971) arguments against utilitarianism and perfectionism are simply considered as fixed points.   
 The specific form of this list would not be based on an idea of 
maximizing each individual’s liberty. Liberals like Rawls (2001:44-5) and Dworkin 
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(1977:266-278) are very clear that liberty as such has no priority or special status in 
justification. I follow Dworkin (1985:189) in that “the fundamental liberties are 
important because we value something else that they protect”, and that is not “the 
commodity of liberty”. It is rather those things that promote the interest in leading a 
good life and each citizen’s status as an equal that “makes the list”. In addition, each 
is to be secured “adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties 
and opportunities” (Rawls 2005:6). One could perhaps use the words “strategic 
goods” instead, but the general idea is that since people differ in their conceptions of 
the good, they are bound to disagree on the value of different goods for distribution. 
So as not to intentionally favor people with specific conceptions, a liberal therefore 
focuses on goods that are “necessary for a broad range of life plans” (Føllesdal 
1996a:64). 
It is not my main priority to make a complete list of rights, liberties and opportunities, 
but the liberal state of the kind envisioned here would include the traditional civil and 
personal liberties to guarantee the right to pursue even unorthodox projects free from 
various legal sanctions. And it would be concerned about its citizens’ ability to make 
intelligent choices and have access to several views on the good life, and thus focus 
on education and secure liberties such as freedom of expression, the press and artistic 
freedom (Kymlicka 1989:13). I do not think the list I would end up with would be too 
different from the one Rawls (2005:291) provides in Political Liberalism: The basic 
rights and liberties (that are to be equal) are “freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience”, “the political liberties and freedom of association”, “the freedoms 
specified by the liberty and integrity of the person”, and “the rights and liberties 
covered by the rule of law”. The basic rationale is in any case to secure those rights, 
liberties and opportunities needed to secure equality and autonomy. However, in the 
final part of this section I clarify my position on basing liberalism on the value of 
autonomy because liberals like Rawls (2005) have come to doubt whether autonomy 
is an appropriate concern on which to ground political institutions and arrangements. 
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Brief Remarks on Egalitarian Liberalism 
A few remarks must also be made about why Rawls and Dworkin, as mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, often are referred to as egalitarian liberals. I believe this is due 
to the consequences they draw from taking the autonomy and equality of individuals 
seriously. The kind of morality this project adheres to can be illustrated by Dworkin’s 
(1985:206-7) defense of equal shares of resources for each citizen. This principle 
holds that each citizen should be permitted to use no more than an equal share of the 
total resources available in a society. It does not mean, however, that constant 
redistribution should take place at any time inequalities occur because this would 
disregard the results of choices people make. It matters when assessing if someone 
has had an equal share of resources what that person has contributed in terms of the 
amount of resources available to all. The inequalities that should warrant 
redistribution, however, are those that arise not as a result from choices made by an 
individual, but circumstance. The proper measure for the resources each should have 
is for Dworkin the share they would have if it were not for “differences of initial 
advantage, luck, and inherent capacity”, all which have nothing to do with choice. It 
is on this basis that the results of market allocation of resources should be corrected 
through redistribution. Rawls (1971:102) has a similar approach when justifying his 
famous “difference principle” in that inequalities that arise due to “contingencies” are 
only allowed if they are to the benefit of the “least fortunate”. In short, the liberal 
egalitarian idea, that the genuine choices that people make are the only permissible 
bases for accepting that citizens have different amounts of resources at their disposal 
to pursue the good life, expresses the liberal evaluative standard this project relies on. 
Arbitrary circumstances or “contingencies” do not justify inequalities. As I now turn 
to the question of minority rights in liberal theory, this distinction plays an important 
role. 
Liberalism, Political Boundaries and Minority Rights 
In the following chapter, I provide a more detailed interpretation of the Northern 
Ireland conflict. The partition of Ireland and the majority-minority relations that have 
characterized the Northern Ireland state are central themes in that discussion. Here, I 
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take a more general look at how modern liberalism has approached such issues more 
generally. In the modern liberal tradition, state neutrality or anti-perfectionism have 
been important principles applying to political institutions, meaning that the state 
should not intentionally promote one or a few conceptions of the good (Kymlicka 
2002:218). Perhaps it is no wonder then that a prevailing liberal approach to pluralism 
within political entities has been to rely on the typical liberal catalogue of individual 
rights. As long as people are free in their private lives to hold, maintain and express 
any attachment they prefer regarding their identity, including ethnic and national 
identity, the state should not respond with anything else than “’benign neglect’” to 
such identities. State and ethnicity should simply be separate. Ethnicity has no role in 
“the distribution of rights, resources and duties”, and accordingly no legal or state 
recognition of such groups are warranted (Kymlicka 1995a:2-4). 
Will Kymlicka (1989; 1995a) has challenged this view from within a liberal 
framework. In short, he argues that individual freedom (autonomy) requires “access to 
a societal culture”. Also, the bond that most of us have to our own culture is very deep 
and gives rise to a legitimate claim to keep that bond (Kymlicka 1995a:76-107). 
Regarding the first point, he notes that when people reflect on and make choices in 
life this is not done in a vacuum, but rather in “a context of choice” where the options 
available are determined by the cultural heritage of that context. Liberals should be 
concerned with these “cultural structures” because their content determines the range 
of options available and the possibility of intelligently examining questions of value 
(Kymlicka 1989:164-5). 
It is important to note that Kymlicka (1989:177-8) does not believe that liberals like 
Rawls and Dworkin have said little about the rights of minority cultures because they 
ignore the importance of a secure cultural context to making meaningful choices. It is 
rather that they have worked with “a simplified model of the nation-state”. That is, a 
model where a political community is one and the same as one single cultural 
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community.7
A natural objection is that while all citizens should have a right of access to a secure 
and rich cultural structure, it does not follow that this has to be the culture they 
currently feel attached to. “Why not let minority cultures disintegrate, so long as we 
ensure their members have access to the majority culture” (Kymlicka 1995a:84)? In 
what resembles a contractual approach to this question, Kymlicka (1995a:85-6) 
claims that while it is not impossible or unimaginable that people can “move between 
cultures”, access to one’s own culture is generally something one can expect people to 
want, and that it is not reasonable to expect anyone to forego that general wish. It is 
possible to leave one’s culture, but it cannot be reasonably expected that people do so. 
This argument also leads me to consider it a matter of circumstance rather than choice 
when people find themselves belonging to a minority due to the drawing of political 
boundaries.  
 In such a community, all have access to this single cultural membership 
as a sort of “public good”. Once it is recognized that many societies are culturally 
plural, it becomes much harder to claim that all citizens have an adequate protection 
of their culture, a basic precondition for their autonomy. This is because in one 
important respect the state cannot be neutral. Governments do have to decide on what 
language(s) to use in public institutions, how internal boundaries are drawn, which 
public holidays to have and what state symbols to use (Kymlicka 1995a:108). It is 
simply impossible not to make decisions on what societal culture(s) that will be 
supported (Kymlicka 1995a:111). Regarding Northern Ireland specifically, the 
location of the external boundaries is also morally relevant. Generally, it can be said 
that which side of a border an individual finds herself can have profound 
consequences for freedom, welfare, identity, and in some cases even survival 
(Buchanan 2003:231). 
                                              
7 Canovan (1996:13) claims that many political theorists rely on and take for granted a view of political communities as 
nation-states, but that this assumption is seldom made explicit. 
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To clarify, what is meant by culture in this discussion does not refer to a kind of 
group characterized by a set of very specific shared moral values similar to what was 
earlier referred to as a conception of the good. What is in question are societal 
cultures of the type that share such things as language and a history which is then the 
relevant “meaningful context of choice”. For most people this culture is their nation 
within which there is most likely widespread disagreement on more particular 
questions of value (Kymlicka 1995a:92-3). An additional factor that supports 
measures to ensure people’s secure access to their own societal culture, meaning their 
national culture, is this culture’s importance to the self-respect and identity of 
individuals. If that culture is in decay, “is persecuted or discriminated against, the 
options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less attractive, and 
their pursuit less likely to be successful” (Margalit & Raz 1995:87). A liberal like 
Rawls (2001:59) has emphasized the importance of institutions in society securing the 
“social bases of self-respect” because it is essential for individuals if they are to be 
able to pursue their projects “with self-confidence”. Since how one’s national culture 
fares or is held in esteem in a society is closely tied to this self-respect, it seems 
obvious that liberals should be concerned with how political institutions influence and 
treat such cultures. 
Kymlicka (1995a:113) concludes that liberal equality demands that all national groups 
that want to maintain themselves as a distinct culture should have the opportunity to 
do so. Since the majority national group in a democracy always through its majority 
position will have its societal culture supported and has the power to protect interests 
related to culture in legislative processes, suitable rights for national minorities are 
warranted to secure the same benefits and opportunities that the majority enjoys. 
Minority rights thus perceived are simply compensations for unequal circumstances. 
But all kinds of minority rights are not necessarily consistent with liberalism. A useful 
set of terms to explain what kind of rights a liberal can and cannot support is that of 
“’internal restrictions’” and “’external protections’”. The former are not justifiable 
from a liberal point of view as they involve measures to protect a culture through 
restricting internal dissent from members. The latter can be defended in liberal terms 
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as they refer to a type of rights that seek to protect a group from the impact of 
decisions made by the larger society (Kymlicka 1995a:35). The appropriate degree of 
protection should be limited to compensating for unequal circumstances, not to install 
the minority as oppressors of the majority.8
Some Clarifying Remarks on Autonomy-Based Liberalism 
 In any case, it is this kind of liberal 
justification of minority rights described here that provides the evaluative standard 
against which the arrangements of the BA are to be judged. 
I take it for granted that all liberals see the kind of autonomy that secures the pursuit 
of currently held beliefs and the right not to be punished or disadvantaged for 
pursuing projects when beliefs about the good are revised as uncontroversial grounds 
to justify a political regime. It is the last aspect of autonomy that was described earlier 
that is the source of controversy. As Føllesdal (1996a:63-4) puts it, the “interest, in 
critical assessment and improvement on one’s existing conception of the good is not 
shared by all”. He also believes that good reasons cannot be given to all that such 
critical distance to one’s own beliefs is of value. The question in liberal and 
contractual terms becomes if institutions proposed based on an interest in this kind of 
autonomy can be reasonably rejected by some. 
The defense for maintaining the importance of this kind of autonomy in political 
argument comes in two parts. First of all, the view defended here holds that political 
institutions should be concerned with the development of the ability to critically 
examine conceptions of the good. It does not, however, endorse any kind of forced 
critical distance to one’s ends or punish people who choose not to engage in critical 
revision of their beliefs. There are indeed good reasons to ask if any liberal actually 
tries to justify such forced critical assessment, even though a liberal like John Stuart 
Mill has been accused of doing so. But liberal institutions do tend to make such 
                                              
8 See Kymlicka (1989:245-52) on how this liberal approach to minority rights cannot be seen as justifying apartheid. 
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autonomy possible (Barry 2002b:119-20), and I see no reason to regret it and maintain 
it as one of several arguments for such institutions.  
Secondly, once forced critical distance to one’s beliefs is ruled out, I believe that it 
becomes necessary to ask if not most or even all would include autonomy as critical 
reflection on the good as an important and legitimate interest that can be reasonably 
accepted as justifying claims for the form political institutions should take. It is after 
all an idea that is widely shared by citizens of Western democracies, and those who 
reject it tend to be small groups that demand institutions that restrict individuals’ 
opportunity to critically reflect on inherited beliefs and act according to new values if 
they come to endorse such. Some relevant examples are the Amish and Hutterites 
(Kymlicka 2002:243).  
As long as a system of political institutions does not directly force individuals to 
critically examine their beliefs or unduly disadvantage them for failing to do so, I 
cannot see in light of the widespread belief in most Western democracies in the 
importance of such autonomy that institutions should not be formed in a way that 
facilitates an ability to reflect on value, and that such institutions can be justified with 
reference to this interest, among others. The case at hand concerns a Western 
democracy and there is no evidence that hostility to individual autonomy is on the 
political agenda in Northern Ireland today. I therefore see it as unproblematic to apply 
the kind of liberalism I have defended here to the BA. And generally there is little 
evidence that conflicts between national minorities and majority groups are about the 
minority wanting to establish a political order that rejects individual autonomy 
(Kymlicka 2002:338). 
2.4 Research and Conflict 
Studying and researching conflicts bring forth some methodological challenges. For 
example, hypotheses about the real underlying causes of a conflict are very hard to 
test, not in the sense that it would be hard to find empirical data that would support 
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one, but rather that one is not in a position to control for alternative explanatory 
variables, and therefore cannot definitively falsify the hypothesis in question or its 
rivals.9
A common strategy to avoid the problems connected with the testing of hypotheses in 
the social sciences is to try to emulate the experimental setting by employing the 
comparative method,
 What remains are often alternative explanations where the choice of one 
among many is based on considerations of reasonableness, and consequently parties 
to a conflict take great interest in influencing considerations of reasonableness made 
by outsiders (Butenschøn 1998:252). In the case of Northern Ireland, explaining the 
conflict by drawing parallels with other well known conflicts to build up one’s own 
interpretations and viewpoints has been a popular exercise both to gain internal and 
external support (McGarry 2001:3). Winning the debate on how to correctly describe 
a situation both sets the premises for subsequent arguments and conclusions and 
limits the scope of considerations on whether certain outcomes are likely and more 
importantly for this project, if they are legitimate (just) (Butenschøn 1998:252).  
10
In the social sciences we ultimately cannot escape that we a) have to 
argue that our description of the situation at hand that forms the basis 
of our analysis is both reasonable and fruitful, b) that these arguments 
will be more or less problematic because their validity can always be 
doubted from alternative points of view, and c) that the validity always 
will be a matter of dispute if there are strongly conflicting interests 
attached to the conclusions.  
 but even then we cannot fully escape having to make 
judgments based on reasonableness. What, for example, are the correct criteria for 
holding something as “similar” or “different” (Butenschøn 1998:253)? Butenschøn 
(ibid., my translation) states that:  
The researcher must, based on her hopefully fruitful and reasonable description of the 
situation no matter how disputed by others, go about with evaluating hypotheses and 
                                              
9 Indeed, it is quite seldom that we in the social sciences at all deal with data that can be directly manipulated by the 
researcher as the experimental method requires (Smelser 1973; Lijphart 1971). 
10 On the comparative method in general see for example Lijphart (1971). 
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claims. The theoretical insights of her discipline should then serve as criteria of 
validity in relation to hypotheses and claims (Butenschøn 1998:254). I will organize 
my methodological strategy around some suggested answers to questions that arise 
from Butenschøns’s three propositions on social science research just outlined as “a”, 
“b” and “c”. 
Arguing for a reasonable (first part of “a”) case description should be based on an 
awareness of alternative points of view (“b”) and it must deal with the fact that strong 
and conflicting interests are linked to the possible conclusions (“c”) when defining 
the “true nature” of the Northern Ireland conflict. The arguments proposed for my 
case interpretation should therefore address and discuss at least the main existing 
accounts of the conflict as well as taking into consideration the dangers that are 
connected with scientific inquiry into a field where strong motivations exist that 
might produce accounts and interpretations that are not merely evidence-driven. 
Given my inevitable dependence on secondary sources, I must be aware of the 
conflicting interests that have shaped historical accounts of Northern Ireland. In 
addition, for the case interpretation to be fruitful as well as reasonable, it must be 
relevant to the research question. The remaining part of this chapter will be dedicated 
to an elaboration on how the concern about strong political interests connected with 
academic research should be understood and tackled in the case of Northern Ireland. 
Also, I will highlight the importance of relying on a multiple number of sources as 
well as upholding a principle of scientific research as a public process even when one 
has an awareness of how to deal with politically biased sources. 
Dealing with the Contested History of Northern Ireland      
Tonge (2005:9) makes an interesting point when he states that “part of the problem 
with formulating a solution for the difficulties of Northern Ireland is the extent to 
which the history of Ireland is itself contested”. This is an important reminder that 
Irish history is not only relevant for historians, but also for social scientists who want 
to say something about the politics of Northern Ireland today. One tradition in the 
writing of Irish history has been to organize it around a nationalist perspective or 
 35 
alternatively in direct opposition to it (Boyce and O’Day 1996:13). Likewise, two of 
the schools of thought on research on the Northern Ireland problem can be named 
with political labels, namely “traditional nationalist” and “traditional unionist” 
(Whyte 1990:114). Aughey (2005:8) points to the dangers of “presentism” in the 
narration of history, “a reading of the past that already assumes the present”. Political 
manipulation becomes a real threat if the past is selectively constructed: “in order to 
justify what we want to do in the present this is what the past must have been like”. 
This is a challenge for both historians and social scientists alike. It is therefore a 
timely question that Boyce and O’Day (1996:3) ask related to what has been called 
“revisionism and revisionist controversy” in the writing of Irish history: “What, if 
any, part should an academic historian play in the political uses of the past?” I have 
no better suggested remedy to avoid accepting history or political science accounts 
written with a primary agenda of justifying present ambitions than to affirm that 
“evidence is, and remains, the basis of the discipline of history” (Boyce and O’Day 
1996:12) and clearly also for political science. This is not to say that evidence a priori 
cannot be said to support an Irish nationalist or British unionist interpretation of Irish 
history or the Northern Ireland conflict, but it reminds us that scientific research must 
as far as possible try to avoid the danger of letting political agendas unduly influence 
what evidence we use (and do not use) and how we interpret it.  
Ottar Dahl (1973:75-6) highlights the need to scrutinize the conditions surrounding 
the origins of an historical account in order to be able to judge its credibility. Such 
scrutiny must among other things include evaluation of both the ability and 
willingness of the person giving the account in telling the truth. It is my view that 
such considerations are appropriate not only for researching historical sources, but 
also when using the work of historians, political scientists or other academics in 
building a case interpretation for a social scientific purpose. And it will therefore 
serve as a methodological guideline for me in the use of secondary literature on Irish 
history and political interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
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Research as a Public Process and the Use of Multiple Sources 
Furthermore, in the process of arguing for my case interpretation, I will draw on a 
number of different authors of Irish history and interpretations of the Northern Ireland 
conflict subject to the scrutiny just outlined. A thorough effort will be made to 
provide an extensive and accurate list of references to secure an opportunity for any 
reader to also critically examine my sources to judge if I have been true to my 
methodological program of relying on appropriate and unselective evidence. The 
combination of drawing on a wide range of sources as well as conscientiously 
referring to them is meant to contribute to both the possibility of testing how reliable 
my procedure is, and also to provide the best conditions for increasing the validity of 
my conclusions and the ability for others to judge on this. Indeed, King, Keohane & 
Verba (1994:8) stress the importance of public procedures in scientific research so 
that the reliability of data can be assessed and for “the scholarly community” to be 
able to judge the validity of what has been done. Robert K. Yin (2003:98) points to a 
better chance for reaching more convincing and accurate conclusions and findings 
when relying on a plurality of sources. He refers to this as “data triangulation”. I agree 
with these methodological recommendations and will try to conduct myself 
accordingly. 
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3. An Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict 
The rationale of this chapter is to develop an argument on how the Northern Ireland 
conflict should be properly understood in the context of serving as an informed basis 
for judgments on normatively legitimate political institutions for Northern Ireland. 
Rupert Taylor’s (2006) depiction of how supporters of the BA view the conflict will 
serve as an initial hypothesis on the nature of the conflict, and the conclusion takes 
the form of assessing how far it holds. In the following, knowledge of basic facts 
about the political history of Northern Ireland is taken for granted and the level of 
detail when scrutinizing alternative interpretations is restricted to allow sufficient 
room for other parts of the project.11
Brief Remarks on Sources 
 
John Whyte’s Interpreting Northern Ireland (1990) is substantially relied on in the 
building of this case interpretation. Whyte’s book is to my knowledge the most 
thorough analysis of academic work on the Northern Ireland conflict produced. He 
wrote as a political scientist, yet drew on not only works of political science, but also 
history, sociology, economics, anthropology, geography, law, and social psychology. 
In this sense, he was a model example of a researcher employing “data triangulation”. 
I supplement Whyte’s work with several newer accounts by leading scholars in the 
field to make the presentation and argument more comprehensive and fully updated 
where needed. An important source of survey data and interpretation of such will be 
Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott’s (2006) book Conflict and Consensus, that makes use of a 
wide range of surveys12
                                              
11 For a more detailed version of the argument, see Worren (2008). Good general introductions of basic facts on the 
Northern Ireland conflict are provided by Tonge (2002) and Mulholland (2003). 
 on values and attitudes in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic conducted over time. 
12 The data of the study comprises of among others: The European Values Study (1981,1990, 1999-2000), European Social 
Survey (2002-2003), Eurobarometer Surveys, etc. For a full account see Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott (2006:234-6). 
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Taylor’s Hypothesis on What BA-Supporters Believe 
Taylor (2006:217) claims that “two core mutually reinforcing ideas” are behind the 
BA. One is that consociationalism is the only democratic remedy available to solve 
the conflict. The other refers to the nature of the conflict: “Northern Ireland is deeply, 
indeed irrefutably, divided between two competing ethno-national communities”. This 
view holds that the conflict is between a Protestant and a Catholic community, which 
are seen as constituting “intractable ethno-national groups with distinctive and 
different cultural traditions, values and needs”. “The categories of ‘Protestant’ and 
‘Catholic’ are taken to be synonymous with Ulster unionist and Irish nationalist 
politics” respectively. The political parties representing these national aims are seen 
as “locked into a power struggle to maximise group interests”. 
3.1 Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Conflict 
John Whyte (1990:114) suggests a classificatory scheme that sorts interpretations of 
the conflict into categories based on who the researcher sees as the main antagonists. 
Four pairs of antagonists are identified where authors have tended to see one of the 
pairs as the most important, yet often acknowledging the additional significance of 
one or more of the other pairs. The pairs are as follows: “Britain v. Ireland”, 
“Southern Ireland v. Northern Ireland”, “Capitalist v. worker”, “Protestant v. Catholic 
within Northern Ireland”. On this basis, he proposes four labels to describe four types 
of “basic interpretations” of the Northern Ireland problem: “traditional nationalist”, 
“traditional unionist”, “Marxist” and “two-community, or internal-conflict”. McGarry 
and O’Leary (1995:6) operate with similar labels categorizing analyses of the conflict 
when they state that “most explanations of Northern Ireland which are not nationalist, 
unionist or Marxist are overwhelmingly endogenous in their foci for explanation”. 
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Nationalist, Unionist and Marxist Interpretations 
The traditional nationalist interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict is in a 
nutshell that “the people of Ireland form one nation”, and that “the fault for keeping 
Ireland divided lies with Britain”(Whyte 1990:117). The traditional unionist 
interpretation formulated in a similarly short fashion is that “there are two distinct 
peoples in Ireland, unionist and nationalist (or Protestant and Catholic)” and that “the 
core of the problem is the refusal of nationalists to recognize this fact, and to accord 
to unionists the same right of self-determination as they claim for themselves”. This 
view is accompanied by a diametrically different view on the role of Britain. Great 
Britain is seen as an ally, albeit an unreliable one that is seen to be too soft on 
nationalists (Whyte 1990:146).  
Marxist analysis of the Irish and Northern Ireland conflict comes in many versions 
(Whyte 1990:175-193). In its oldest version, where the revolutionary James Connolly 
stands out as the most prominent advocate, the conflict was mainly seen as a struggle 
between employer and worker. National independence through a break with the 
British Empire was seen as paramount, as the Empire was seen to be the most resolute 
upholder of capitalism. A problem with his analysis was, however, that the Protestant 
working class in Ireland wanted to maintain the link with Britain, but if partition 
could be avoided and independence gained, Connolly believed that class politics 
would replace the national issue. When partition became reality, the goal of Marxists 
was to undo it. Later, Marxists focused on the colonial aspects of the situation, and 
that of a capitalist class in Northern Ireland keeping the working class divided 
through sectarianism and “differential discrimination”, which meant exploiting both 
Protestant and Catholic workers, but giving Protestants slight but visible advantages 
over Catholics. Thus Protestant workers were locked into an alliance with their bosses 
rather than fellow workers. Other Marxists came to focus on how nationalists in the 
South stirred up the Catholics in the North against the northern state, and viewed this 
as the obstacle to working class unity. 
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The Internal-Conflict Interpretation 
The school of thought that can be broadly referred to as internal conflict approach or 
interpretation distinguishes itself from the previous perspectives by its insistence that 
endogenous factors to Northern Ireland are those that are most important when 
explaining the conflict. The three previously outlined approaches see the problem 
mainly as a British, Irish or capitalist responsibility, in other words a focus on 
exogenous factors (Whyte 1990:194). As referred to earlier, internal conflict 
interpretations can also be labeled “two community” interpretations, thus making it 
clear that the opposing communities within Northern Ireland are the protagonists in 
focus. Put simply, one can say that such analyses see Northern Ireland as the unit of 
analysis, being “a distinct political, economic and cultural system” (McGarry and 
O’Leary 1995:5). Most internal conflict interpretations do acknowledge the 
importance of outside factors such as Britain and the Republic, but mainly through 
their impact on internal conflict through the two communities’ different attitudes to 
the two states. Events in the early years of the Troubles, such as the re-emergence of 
the IRA, the arrival of the British Army and the introduction of direct rule from 
London, can help explain why most theorists of the internal-conflict school, though 
insisting on the primacy of endogenous factor, have not ignored exogenous factors in 
their work (Whyte 1990:194-5). Within this tradition, perspectives such as “classical 
pluralist theory” which has explained the conflict as due to a lack “of a balanced 
distribution of conflicting interests”, mainstream consociational theory, and 
integrationist theory that focuses on transforming divided societies, have all been 
popular approaches to the Northern Ireland conflict and have been predominantly 
internally focused (McGarry 2001:14-18). On the other hand, some have worked from 
a perspective that can be labelled “linkage theory” and have focused more specifically 
on how exogenous developments have been linked to internal developments in 
Northern Ireland (McGarry 2001:18-20). One is left with a clear impression of 
diversity when surveying the field of academic work in the internal conflict tradition. 
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3.2 Testing the Hypothesis – An Evaluation of the 
Perspectives 
Testing “Taylor’s hypothesis” must be done in several steps. So far, I have mainly 
looked at what the different perspectives claim rather than submit them to evaluation. 
In terms of popularity, John Whyte (1990:202) found that the internal-conflict 
interpretation emerged as the one subscribed to by most academics when looking at 
the period from the outbreak of the Troubles to the end of 1989. Before that time, 
considering that publications were significantly fewer in number, they could almost 
without exception be classified as either traditional unionist/nationalist or Marxist 
interpretations. In terms of evaluation, Whyte (1990:205) offers the following 
comments: 
The drawback of the traditional nationalist school is that it took 
insufficient account of the separate identity of Northern Protestants. 
The drawback of the traditional unionist school is that it took 
insufficient account of the community divide within Northern Ireland. 
The limitation of the Marxist approach is that its practitioners have 
been unable to agree among themselves on what conclusions to draw 
from their method. A limitation of the internal-conflict school is that 
though there is agreement in broad terms on the nature of the problem, 
there is no agreement on the nature of the solution. 
These substantial but brief remarks serve as a starting point for a more elaborate 
evaluation. Being subscribed to by most academics is of course in itself not a 
sufficient indicator of establishing truth, or less ambitiously put, plausibility. First, it 
needs to be addressed in more detail why the traditional nationalist and unionist 
interpretations have declined in popularity and decide whether these reasons are 
sufficient to dismiss them. Thereafter, the same procedure is followed for the Marxist 
perspectives. It will be shown that these perspectives do have some merit, but they 
nevertheless cannot be seen as self-standing alternatives to some form of internal 
conflict or two communities interpretation. They can, however, cast light on important 
dimensions of aspects of the conflict regardless of how one concludes on the 
importance of endogenous and exogenous factors. Therefore, the following sections 
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are dedicated to establish what the most credible internal-conflict interpretation 
should include and how far this corresponds to the initial hypothesis. 
The Limits of the Traditional Nationalist Interpretation 
The main weakness of the traditional nationalist perspective is its underestimation of 
the distinct and enduring, yet changing (this is returned to in more detail), identity of 
an overwhelmingly Protestant unionist community. There are many reasons to 
attribute the existence of this identity to more than the influence of British policy over 
the years. True, both Catholics and Presbyterians participated in the 1798 rising to 
sever links with Britain, but at some point after this, the Protestants in the northeast of 
Ireland became solidly in favor of remaining part of Britain (Whyte 1990:123). Three 
historians, David Miller, Alvin Jackson and James Loughlin, have researched in depth 
the attitudes of unionists in the period after the Act of Union of 1800.13
I find it an important indicator of the strength and independence of this identity that 
450 000 men and women from Ulster signed a declaration, “the Solemn League and 
Covenant”, pledging themselves to oppose Home Rule
 Although they 
do not agree on how best to describe unionist ideology in terms of how attached it 
was to the British link, they do agree that British manipulation cannot account for the 
fact that there existed a distinct and strongly held Ulster unionism that did not share 
the aims of Irish nationalism (Whyte 1990:127-9).  
14
                                              
13 The Act of Union abolished the Irish parliament and gave Irish representatives a small proportion of seats in the UK 
parliament and formally established the Union of Great Britain and Ireland (Mulholland 2003:7-8; Tonge 2002:5). 
 for Ireland through “using 
all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy” 
(Mulholland 2003:19; Walker 2004:34-5). The “present conspiracy” the Covenant 
refers to was the Liberal government’s bill on Home Rule for Ireland that was 
introduced and passed in the House of Commons in 1912. The Liberals were 
dependent on the votes of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the Commons, and 
the IPP “traded” support for Home Rule from the Liberals with voting for the 
14A Home Rule for Ireland bill was introduced to the Commons in 1886 by Prime Minister Gladstone and defeated. In 1893 
a similar bill was passed by the Commons, but defeated in the House of Lords (Mulholland 2003:16-17). 
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Government’s budget as well as ensuring the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act, 
which limited the House of Lord’s right of veto. The passing of the 1911 Parliament 
Act made Home Rule for Ireland likely to be enacted by 1914, as the House of Lords 
could now only postpone it (Knirck 2006:27-8). It is the nature of Ulster unionist 
opposition to these events that I think illustrates their deepfelt distinctness from 
nationalist Ireland, and that is why it cannot be accounted for in full with reference 
only to British manipulation. Not only did 450 000 people sign up to use all means 
against Home Rule, but the Ulster Unionist Council in September 1912 devised a 
provisional government for Ulster that was to take control of the Province if Home 
Rule became law. In addition, the Ulster Volunteer Force was set up and armed 
through extensive importation of weaponry, making an organized and disciplined 
political army out of the already many unionist volunteers who had been secretly 
training to oppose Home Rule if necessary (Walker 2004:36-7). These expressions of 
organizational strength and the willingness to rebel against their own government do 
in my opinion make it too simple to attribute divisions in Ireland to British 
manipulation even though the Ulster unionists did receive support and encouragement 
from the Conservative Party, and especially its leader at the time, Bonar Law. As 
Alvin Jackson (2004:7) puts it, Home Rule became “a central point of differentiation 
between British Liberals and Conservatives”. 
The Limits of the Traditional Unionist Interpretation  
The above account might lead one to see the weaknesses of the traditional nationalist 
interpretation as a strong argument for accepting the corresponding unionist 
interpretation. However, it does not follow from this that partition in order to 
accommodate this distinct majority identity present in the northeast of Ireland proved 
problematic only because Irish nationalists in the South refused to accept self-
determination for unionists. Such an analysis overlooks factors like the precise 
location of the border, the presence of a significant non-unionist minority, and the 
practices of the Northern Ireland state once established (Whyte 1990:162-9). I will 
return to the last point because it is relevant for further purposes than pointing out the 
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weaknesses of traditional unionist interpretation. For now, I focus on the aspects of 
the non-unionist minority and the location of the border.  
Of the six counties included when Northern Ireland was created in 1920, two of them, 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, had a nationalist majority population. Only Antrim, Armagh, 
Derry/Londonderry and Down had a unionist majority. Today, Antrim and Down are 
the only two counties that with any certainty can be said to contain a unionist majority 
population (Tonge 2006:16). The results from the last all-Ireland Westminster 
election in 1918 show that in the counties that became Northern Ireland, nationalist 
parties won 30.9 per cent of the votes in contested seats, 19.1 for Sinn Fein’s radical 
secessionist platform, and 11.8 for the more moderate and autonomy-seeking IPP 
(McGarry and O’Leary 1995:39). In other words, a significant minority of non-
unionists was present within Northern Ireland from its creation and it is growing in 
numbers and proportion. Seeing Northern Ireland as a natural consequence of self-
determination for unionists only denied by the southern Irish is a too facile and one-
dimensional perspective. 
The Limits of Marxist Perspectives 
Of the Marxist perspectives, the colonial interpretation seems to have some merit 
based on the fact that Scottish and English settlers did come to Ulster in the 
seventeenth century, just like they did to America. Furthermore, opinion polls in Great 
Britain have shown a majority opinion of wanting Britain to withdraw from Northern 
Ireland, suggesting that Northern Ireland is not seen as an integral part of the country 
(Whyte 1990:178). This view has endured in Great Britain, although with a certain 
decline in later years (Tonge 2002:207). However, acknowledging the colonial 
aspects of Northern Ireland does not imply that immediate British withdrawal, or 
more dramatically, repatriation of descendents of settlers, are either solutions to the 
problem or in the latter case a morally defendable measure. As I have argued, the 
identity of Protestants in Northern Ireland is unlikely to change dramatically in the 
case of British withdrawal and forcefully removing a people that know no other home 
based on events in the seventeenth century would be both unreasonable and immoral. 
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What a colonial perspective can contribute to is a further understanding of why there 
are divisions in Northern Ireland today and how they have manifested themselves 
historically. Indeed, many scholars with a comparative focus have pointed to how the 
establishment of “settler control systems” and initial dispossession of natives have 
contributed to intensify divisions in societies such as Ireland, South Africa, Algeria, 
and Rhodesia (McGarry 2001:20-22). It is also worth noting that seeing Britain as 
totally committed to an imperialist retention of Ireland does not seem supported by the 
fact that the Irish Free State was granted even greater autonomy than envisaged by 
Home Rule at a time when Britain militarily was in a position of being able to keep 
the whole of Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 1995:359). The end of the Cold War has 
also given stronger credibility to the claim of British neutrality that was clearly 
formulated by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Brooke, in 1990, that 
Britain had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland (Duffy 
2005:236). But as argued, aspects of British colonial policy have had an impact on 
divisions that exist today.  
As a response to Marxist interpretations in general, the main objection, as I see it, is 
that it is too simple to attribute problems merely to economic factors and the agendas 
of the ruling class. I agree with McGarry and O’Leary (1995:71) when they state that 
“treating national, ethnic and religious discourses as ‘superstructural’, epiphenomena 
of economic structures and ruling class interests, is classical historical materialism, 
but it does not advance understanding of Northern Ireland”. Evidence of differential 
discrimination has certainly been shown (Whyte 1990:61-4), but not in the systematic 
fashion that one would have expected if this had been an all out conspiracy by the 
ruling class. And even if this were historically true, what would the economic 
interests of capitalists today stand to gain from the current divisions, yet they remain? 
I will, however, return to the impact that discrimination has had on the conflict as 
seen from an internal conflict point of view.  
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There is also much to be said for the point of view that the working classes 
themselves have been even more sectarian and nationalistic than their own co-
religionists in the middle and upper classes. This suggests that if the Protestant 
working class severed ties with the middle class leadership of unionism, they would 
probably not move towards the Irish nationalism adhered to by many in the Catholic 
working class, but more likely move further in the opposite direction (Whyte 
1990:181). Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott (2006:66-7) have found that the main predictor 
of holding a British identity among Protestants is that of social class. Working class 
and lower class non-manual workers are “significantly more likely to choose a British 
identity than their service class counterparts”. It simply does not hold up to scrutiny 
that working class Protestants would be instinctively Irish or nationalist if cut loose 
from their more well-off co-religionists. Divisions in Northern Ireland cannot be 
wholly or even mainly be explained by economic or colonialist factors. 
A Protestant and Unionist Majority and A Catholic and Nationalist Minority? 
Having to a large degree established the limitations of the now less popular 
perspectives, I turn directly to confront the initial hypothesis that clearly expresses a 
variant of internal-conflict and more specifically two-communities interpretation and 
see how far it holds. 
Religion 
That Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are the two dominating religious groups 
in Northern Ireland is beyond doubt. Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott (2006:36) estimate on 
the basis of survey data that about 40 per cent of the population claim to belong to the 
Roman Catholic Church, while different Protestant churches can claim the allegiance 
of about 44 per cent. 14 per cent claim to be non-affiliated, leaving only a very small 
number to non-Christian religions and those who do not want to answer questions on 
such a subject. When those who were now non-affiliated were asked if they had ever 
belonged to a denomination, 40 per cent of those had been Protestants, either 
Anglican or Presbyterian, 18 per cent had been Catholic, and 35 per cent had also 
previously been non-affiliated (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:39). In a European 
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context, despite secularization having started to have an impact, Ireland, North and 
South remain “among the most Christian parts of Europe and among the most 
committed to institutionalised religious activity” (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:54-
55). What needs to be explored is how this religious make-up of Northern Ireland 
relates to other aspects of personal identity. 
The Protestants 
Right before the outbreak of the Troubles, a survey on national identity showed that 
20 per cent of Protestants thought of themselves as “Irish”, 39 per cent preferred the 
label “British”, and “Ulster” identity was indicated by 32 per cent (Whyte 1990:67). 
When the question on national identity was replicated in a survey in 1978 after many 
years of violent conflict, a clear trend emerged. Two-thirds of Protestants now 
preferred “British” as a label for their national identity, with only 20 and 8 per cent 
now indicating “Ulster” or “Irish” respectively (Whyte 1990:68). This trend of decline 
in Ulster and Irish identity with a corresponding rise of British identity among 
Protestants has not been reversed since (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:62). By 1986 
the “Irish” category on self-perception of national identity had dropped to 3 per cent, 
and even later, Mulholland (2003:147) wrote that only one in fifty Protestants see 
themselves as “Irish”. From 1989 on, the option of “Northern Irish” was introduced, 
and has attracted some support among Protestants and the picture in 2003 was one of 
about 20 per cent claiming Northern Irish national identity while almost 70 per cent 
preferred British  (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott (2006:62-4).   
So how does this picture translate into what can be called “political identity”? A 
survey conducted in 1999-2000 estimated that 66 per cent of Protestants viewed 
themselves as “Unionist”, only 0.7 per cent as “Nationalist”, and 33.3 per cent as 
“Neither” (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:76). This actually represented a low point 
for Unionist political identity among Protestants and the typical proportion before and 
after 1999-2000 has been at around 70 per cent or above (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 
2006:77-8). The group that perhaps can be said to have the character that the 
hypothesis suggests all Protestants have, namely Protestants that are both British and 
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unionist, is estimated at comprising 53 per cent of Protestants (Fahey, Hayes and 
Sinnott 2006:83). As for the so-called “national question”, or what can be called 
“constitutional preference”, the trend among Protestants has been one of stability. 
From 1978 to 2003, no less than 88 per cent have indicated that they prefer Northern 
Ireland to remain in the UK, with a high point of 95 per cent in 1989 (Fahey, Hayes 
and Sinnott 2006:94). 
The Catholics 
When looking at the same aspects relating to Catholics in Northern Ireland another 
picture emerges. The same 1968 survey referred to above had 76 per cent of Catholics 
seeing themselves as Irish, 15 as British and 5 as Ulster in terms of national identity 
(Whyte 1990:67). In the case of trends within the Catholic community, there has not 
been a dramatic turn as in the Protestant case towards British identity. Allowing for 
the effect of “Northern Irish” being introduced, “there is no strong trend up or down 
in the choice of either an ‘Irish’ or ‘British’ identity among Catholics in Northern 
Ireland (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:61-2). About a quarter of Catholics tend to 
choose “Northern Irish”, while almost two-thirds prefer “Irish” (ibid.). 
Moving to “political identity” among Catholics, 57.7 per cent see themselves as 
“Nationalist”, 0.5 as “Unionist”, and 41.8 “Neither” (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 
2006:76). The proportion of Catholics who conforms to the hypothesis of being Irish 
and nationalist amounts to 45 per cent (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:83). And 
looking at the constitutional question, keeping in mind that comparisons over time are 
complicated due to different wordings and options being presented to respondents as 
well as changing political circumstances,15
                                              
15 See Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott (2006:90). 
 a solid majority of Catholics tend to favor 
a united Ireland. But a significant minority wants Northern Ireland to remain in the 
UK. Over time, the per cent has generally been somewhat over 60 for a united 
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Ireland, while remaining in the UK has declined a bit and stands at about a quarter of 
the Catholic population (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:94). 
Compared to Protestants, Catholics generally tend to be slightly less Irish and 
nationalist than Protestants tend to be British and unionist. However, it is striking that 
so many of them actually hold on to an Irish national identity and a preference for a 
united Ireland. Consider the following argument: There remained outside the borders 
of Northern Ireland a substantial number of Protestants that became citizens in the 
Irish Free State and later the Republic. This was a result of not all Protestants on the 
island residing in the six counties that became Northern Ireland. It can be argued that 
the precise boundaries of Northern Ireland were a compromise between securing a 
large enough Protestant majority16
The Non-Affiliated 
 and that of creating an economically viable entity 
(Walker 2004:46), and this can explain both the “exclusion” of a number of 
Protestants, and the “inclusion” of a number of Catholics and nationalists. But more 
importantly, many of these “Southern Protestants” were active participants in the fight 
against Home Rule for Ireland. Today, however, “as far as Protestants in the Republic 
of Ireland are concerned, attachment to an Irish identity is more or less universal” 
(estimated at 94.4 per cent) (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:60). Northern Catholics 
have certainly responded differently in the case of national identity than Southern 
Protestants when it comes to conforming to the majority identity. 
The so-called non-affiliated are not so easy to track over time since they have not 
figured in many of the older surveys, but in the contemporary context some 
observations can be made as to how they respond to the same issues as their more 
religious co-citizens. The most favored national identity among the non-affiliated is 
British, but not as dominant as among Protestants. From a high of around 60 per cent 
it is more recently been closer to 40. There is also a substantial proportion preferring 
                                              
16 Tonge (2005:257), though himself not an advocate of unionist or nationalist interpretations of the conflict, describes the 
principle behind the creation of Northern Ireland in less sugar coated language as “sectarian headcounting”. 
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the “Northern Irish” label, and although numbers have varied, it would be safe to say 
that slightly below 30 per cent has been a typical figure. “Irish” has stood at 
somewhat above 10 per cent, with a recent rise to around 20 (Fahey, Hayes and 
Sinnott 2006:63-4). To sum up for all groups, “national identity is strongly 
differentiated by denominational group, though it is also far from uniform within each 
group. One the one hand, as one might expect, Catholics lean strongly towards an 
Irish identity, Protestants lean towards a British identity, and the non-affiliated are 
mixed“ (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:61).  
“Political identity” also sets the non-affiliated apart, where between 1989 and 2003 
slightly above or under 70 per cent have claimed to be “Neither” (“Unionist or 
“Nationalist”), while “Unionist” has been the second most popular label fluctuating 
between 20 and 30 per cent, and “Nationalist” a clear third often well under 10 per 
cent (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:76-80). As for the non-affiliated and the 
constitutional question, there is not that much material in terms of tracking changes 
over time, but a survey from 1999-2000 suggests that this group solidly favors 
remaining in the UK (75.7 per cent), while a united Ireland has some, but not much 
support (12.1) (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:90). However, before reaching 
preliminary conclusions it needs to be clarified what significance religion has other 
than correlating strongly with other forms of identity. Does religion cause these 
divisions? 
Some Clarifying Remarks on Religion 
From what has been established so far, Northern Ireland seems like a very religious 
place and religion seems significant for other parts of people’s identity. However, I 
will emphasize that data suggest that religious commitment per se does not explain 
the divisions apparent in other forms of identity. I think Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 
(2006:232) put it sensibly when they claim that “this conflict is not about religion but 
rather is one in which religious denomination is the dominant ethnic marker”. Support 
for such a view is suggested by the fact that “lukewarm Catholics and Protestants are 
no less polarised in their identities than those with stronger commitment to their faith. 
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The non-affiliated also show signs of being divided in their identity according to 
whether they are ex-Catholic or ex-Protestant” (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnott 2006:221). 
Identity and the Political Parties 
Since I am concerned with an agreement that was negotiated between the political 
parties of Northern Ireland, it is natural that some observations are made about how 
some of the aspects of identity are related to the support for different political parties 
in Northern Ireland. Tonge (2005:82) makes a comment related to a feature of the 
presentation above, namely the significant number of Protestants, Catholics and non-
affiliated that claim to be neither unionist nor nationalist. He remarks that “the large 
segment of the population that claims to be neither unionist nor nationalist either 
vanishes or changes its mind at elections”. The party that claims to be “neither 
unionist nor nationalist”, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), has never in 
any election received more than 14.4 per cent of the vote (local council election 1977) 
and the general picture has been well under 10 per cent with a downward trend 
(Tonge 2005:89).  
As for religion, none of the other main political parties have any denominational titles 
in their names like a number of parties in other European countries have, and if the 
politicians representing them have a religious agenda, “they have done a good job of 
concealing it, from their followers as well as from others” (McGarry and O’Leary 
2004:185). The four largest parties in Northern Ireland are two unionist parties, the 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party, and two nationalist 
parties, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein. There are of 
course important differences within each bloc, indeed within each party in some 
cases, as to what kind of British unionism or Irish nationalism they advocate. But 
upholding the Union is one of the main goals of the two parties with “unionist” in 
their name, and achieving a united Ireland is important to both the SDLP and Sinn 
Fein. Interestingly, when looking at what religious denominations the various parties 
draw support from a very polarized picture emerges. It reflects the above mentioned 
feature that almost no Catholic would espouse a unionist political identity and almost 
 52 
no Protestant a nationalist identity. Ian McAllister (2004) has, based on a pooled 
sample from surveys covering the period 1989-1999,17
Preliminary Conclusion 
 identified the support for the 
UUP and the DUP as 99 per cent Protestant, and the support for the SDLP as 97 per 
cent Catholic and 3 per cent Protestant, and finally Sinn Fein’s support as 99 per cent 
Catholic. The same numbers for the APNI suggested support as 68 per cent Protestant 
and 32 per cent Catholic. Considering that the “big four” on average poll 80-90 per 
cent of the vote (for a list of elections since 1982 see Tonge 2006:174), my 
interpretation is that it supports the claim that Catholic and Protestant in Northern 
Ireland are ethnic markers just as much as a description of religious affiliation in the 
region. Also, I believe Mitchell (2001:28-29) is justified in describing the party 
system in Northern Ireland as an “ethnic dual party system”, where “fierce party 
competition exists within the context of an overall bipolar constitutional cleavage”. 
Politics has been dominated by “ethnic parties, which seek only the support of the 
electorate on ‘their side’ of the constitutional divide”.  
The initial hypothesis that Northern Ireland is deeply divided between two competing 
ethno-national communities, where Protestant and Catholic are taken to be 
synonymous with unionist and nationalist politics, needs some modification in order 
to grasp the reality the evidence so far suggests. However, it is significant that a 
description provided by a critic (Taylor) about what his opponents believe 
nevertheless seems to capture some features of the Northern Ireland conflict that a 
reasonable case interpretation cannot ignore. Most people in Northern Ireland count 
themselves as either Catholic or Protestant and even though the groups are clearly not 
static monoliths with some form of collective consciousness, religious denomination 
seems to a large degree to coincide with adversarial national identities, political 
identities and preferences on the constitutional question. The main and dominating 
political parties, whose raisons d’être are based largely on their approach to the 
                                              
17 Excludes minor parties and independents, and respondents reporting ‘other’ or ‘no religion’ (McAllister 2004). 
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constitutional question, draw near exclusive support from only one of the two 
religious groups. 
Therefore, I think a slightly reformulated version of the initial hypothesis can serve as 
a reasonable case interpretation of Northern Ireland and its conflict: Northern Ireland 
is dominated by two religious traditions, the Roman Catholic and various strands of 
Protestantism. Catholics tend largely to hold an Irish national identity, a majority of 
them hold a nationalist political identity, and a solid majority of them would prefer 
Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland. Protestants, on the other hand, 
tend to hold a British national identity, a larger majority of them than Catholics who 
are nationalist hold a unionist political identity, and they are overwhelmingly in favor 
of Northern Ireland remaining in the Union. Religion, however, seems more to be an 
ethnic marker in the contemporary context rather than a direct cause to these 
divisions. What is particularly telling about the contrasts of the two religious 
traditions is the almost non-existence of Protestants who are Irish nationalists, and the 
corresponding lack of Catholics who claim to be unionists, which also seems reflected 
in the support for the various political parties. The Catholic case is perhaps especially 
interesting since a substantial minority of Catholics actually hold a constitutional 
preference that is in line with the aims of unionist political parties. That aspect leads 
us to the last factor I believe must be incorporated into a reasonable conclusion of the 
case interpretation, the Northern Ireland state’s practices and perceptions of it before 
the BA. 
The Politics and Perceptions of the Northern Ireland State 
I have established that there are two religious traditions dominating Northern Ireland 
and that these also tend to translate, though not uniformly or causally due to aspects of 
religious doctrine or belief, into opposing national and political identities as well as 
preferences on the constitutional question. But since the main concern is with political 
institutions for such a society, there is one additional aspect that cannot be ignored 
and that is political institutions and policies in Northern Ireland before the BA and the 
population’s perception of those. The type of regime that was practiced in Northern 
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Ireland after its creation has been, like much else in Northern Ireland, the subject of 
conflicting interpretations. What can be said with certainty is that between 1921 and 
1972, when direct rule from Westminster was introduced, the UUP won all the 
elections and as a result held executive power (and legislative) throughout this period 
(Lijphart 1999:33). In 1929, the electoral system was changed from proportional 
representation (PR) to one of single-member plurality, thus ensuring an even stronger 
position for the UUP (McGarry 2004:328). The civil rights movement protested 
against a number of state policies, especially against how these disadvantaged the 
Catholic minority. However, the issue of the extent of and how deliberately the 
regime discriminated against Catholics has been answered differently by different 
commentators.  
Whyte (1990:168) sums up the evidence of several accounts he has scrutinized as “the 
picture is not black, nor white, but grey. The verdict is quite sufficiently damaging to 
the unionist regime”. Tonge (2002:24) also takes a similar point of view when he 
judges “the orthodox view” on discrimination to “lie somewhere between these two 
poles”. Also, a persistent pattern that Whyte (1990:65-6) has noted, and actually 
counts as more important in explaining the conflict than the fact that discrimination 
against Catholics has been established as fact, is the division between the 
communities in believing whether this discrimination actually exists. This is a point to 
which I shortly return. However, one of the defenses used against accusations of 
discrimination among the minority of unionists who indeed admitted that such existed 
was that the Catholics themselves were to blame due to their refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of the state and their loyalty to the southern government which was seen to 
lead to self-exclusion (Whyte 1990:168; Tonge 2002:26-7). Although I cannot go into 
detail about the validity of such an argument, I think it is important to note that an 
ever present feature of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland is that a majority 
has always rejected violence and especially the Church hierarchy has spoken out 
against the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) violence as immoral (Tonge 2002:106). 
Consider the concrete example of the IRA’s reason for abandoning their Border 
Campaign that lasted from 1956-62. It was the hope of the IRA leadership that 
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nationalists in Northern Ireland would be inspired and rise up against the state. This 
did not happen, and when the IRA called off the campaign it cited the lack of interest 
and engagement form northern nationalists as a reason for ending it (Moloney 
2002:50-51). Another significant aspect of the Border Campaign is that not only the 
Northern Ireland state responded with the introduction of security measures such as 
internment to counter the IRA violence, the government in Dublin also introduced 
internment and military tribunals to break the IRA (ibid.). All this suggests that the 
self-exclusion argument hardly can be seen as a legitimate justification for a state that 
allowed discrimination to take place.  
It has been established then that substantial discrimination affected the minority 
religious group in Northern Ireland, a fact that in itself is damaging for any political 
regime. However, in terms of understanding  the conflict it is arguably of even greater 
significance that this feature of the state is another and very significant area of 
difference in opinion between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and 
some argue at least as substantial a difference as can be seen regarding national and 
political identities. Surveys conducted as far apart in time as 1968 and 1986 which 
concerned equality of opportunity and fair treatment both showed that around 70 per 
cent of Protestants and a corresponding proportion of Catholics held opposing view 
on whether Catholics were disadvantaged in Northern Ireland (Whyte 1990:66). 
These surveys, the first concerning treatment generally of Catholics and Protestants, 
and the second regarding equality of opportunity in the job market specifically, show 
the significant differences in perceptions of the Northern Ireland state’s treatment of 
different groups. There is especially one area where the institutions of the state are 
perceived differently most dramatically by Catholics and Protestants. That is in the 
case of policing and criminal justice.   
Whyte (1990:87) comments on a poll from February 1985 where 87 per cent of 
Catholics disapproved compared to only 8 per cent of Protestants when asked the 
question “do you approve or disapprove of the use of plastic bullets by the security 
forces as a weapon during riots?”, that “this is the sharpest division that I have found 
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on any question in any opinion poll held in Northern Ireland”. And he adds that the 
polarization might in reality be even greater due to a general tendency of surveys in 
Northern Ireland to overstate moderate points of view. The plastic bullet example 
might be an extreme one, especially considering that several Catholic children had 
been killed by plastic bullets not too long before the survey was conducted, but when 
looking in general at survey evidence, it is evident that Catholics and Protestants 
disagree substantially on issues that broadly can be termed as lying within the sphere 
of law and order. The issue of security policy divides the groups even more than the 
constitutional issue, according to Whyte (1990:88). An indicator of more recent date 
shows that as late as 1997, 64 per cent of Catholics thought that the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary treated Protestants better than Catholics, while only 15 per cent of 
Protestants shared this view. To sum up, the point of all this is simply that together 
with the conclusion presented above one must add some important features to the 
description and interpretation of the case, namely that the Northern Ireland state has 
had a legacy of discrimination against its minority, a legacy of monopoly of political 
power for one political tradition, and that one of the most profound differences 
between the two communities is how they perceive the effects of state institutions and 
policies. 
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4. Evaluating the Belfast Agreement 
So far I have established a methodological and theoretical framework and an 
interpretation of the conflict that the BA addresses. This chapter evaluates the 
Agreement and asks whether it is illiberal. I start out with a brief outline of the entire 
BA both to give the reader a possibility to assess whether my subsequent choice of 
focus is appropriate and because the Agreement cannot be adequately evaluated if one 
does not take into account its overall structure and content. I then turn to a more 
thorough account of Rupert Taylor’s critique of the BA and present more in detail the 
institutions it is aimed at. The last part of the chapter is the evaluation that deals both 
with the institutions particularly of concern to Taylor and the criticisms of them. I will 
also bring in aspects that Taylor largely ignores because part of my disagreement with 
him rests on what he does not consider in his critique. I also consider some 
alternatives to the BA as I believe such challenges from other arrangements can 
strengthen the defense of the Agreement and the conclusions made in the evaluation 
of it.  
4.1 A Brief Overview of the Agreement 
The BA (The Stationary Office Limited 1998)18
                                              
18 All references from now on simply read: BA 1998. 
 starts out with a “Declaration of 
Support” the participants in the negotiations all stand behind, and which expresses 
some overarching commitments in relation to the Agreement as a whole and the basis 
on which politics in Northern Ireland are to be conducted from now on. These are 
among others: commitments by the participants to democracy and non-violence, 
human rights protection, acknowledgment of the equal legitimacy of different 
political aspirations and the successful working of all the arrangements under the 
Agreement. This part is followed by another section labeled “Constitutional Issues”. 
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Here the participants express their support for the two governments’19
Then follows “Strand One” of the Agreement which sets out the new democratic 
institutions for devolved government in Northern Ireland, most importantly “the 
Assembly” and an “Executive Committee”, the latter led jointly by the “First 
Minister” (FM) and the “Deputy First Minister” (DFM). “Strand Two” relates to the 
establishment of a “North/South Ministerial Council” (NSMC) consisting of 
representatives with executive authority in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. 
They are to come together in this forum “to develop consultation, co-operation and 
action within the island of Ireland – including through implementation on an all-
island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest within the competence of 
the Administrations, North and South”. “Strand Three” creates a “British-Irish 
Council” (BIC) that is to be comprised by representatives of the two governments and 
representatives of devolved institutions in the UK, current and future. The main 
purposes are: exchange of information, discussion and if possible agreement on co-
operation, common policies and actions in areas of mutual interest. Also, the two 
governments agree to establish a standing “British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference” (BIIC), a bilateral forum for the Governments. The Irish Government’s 
“special interest in Northern Ireland” is recognized under these provisions, and 
therefore there will be regular meetings in this forum where the Irish Government 
“may put forward views and proposals” on “non-devolved Northern Ireland matters”. 
 joint 
understanding of how to deal with the issue of the border. This includes statements at 
a highly abstract level on the right to self-determination as well as outlines of 
practical solutions to give effect to and interpret the more general commitments that 
will be part of a new “British-Irish Agreement” (BIA) replacing the “Anglo-Irish 
Agreement” (AIA) from 1985.  
After the three strands, there is a section called “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity”. The section is divided into two parts, the first dealing with human 
                                              
19 This phrase always refers to the British and Irish governments.  
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rights issues and the second with economic, social and cultural issues. Regarding 
human rights, in addition to a general commitment to “mutual respect”, “civil rights” 
and “religious liberties” for all, it is emphasized that due to the particular history of 
Northern Ireland, “the parties affirm in particular” a number of rights: “free political 
thought”, “freedom and expression of religion”, “to pursue democratically national 
and political aspirations”, “to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate 
means”, “to freely choose one’s place of residence”, “to equal opportunity in all social 
and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity”, “to 
freedom from sectarian harassment” and “of women to full and equal political 
participation”. Furthermore, the British Government commits to complete 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into Northern 
Ireland law, a human rights commission for Northern Ireland is to be set up, the Irish 
Government commits to strengthen the protection of human rights in the Republic by 
various measures, co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic on human 
rights is envisaged and finally there are some remarks on measures to handle issues of 
victims from the conflict. Regarding economic, social and cultural issues, strategies 
for economic development are outlined together with strategies particularly aimed at 
“eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities”. 
There are also some provisions for the recognition and promotion of the diversity of 
languages in Northern Ireland with a special focus being given the Irish language. 
Lastly, the issue of symbols and emblems in public settings is recognized as sensitive, 
and a future awareness of how such an issue must be handled to “promote mutual 
respect rather than division” is emphasized.  
Following these sections is one on the decommissioning of the weapons of 
paramilitary organizations, directly followed by a new section regarding security 
arrangements in Northern Ireland and the path to normalization of these. Then there is 
a section addressing policing and the criminal justice system pointing to reviews in 
both areas. It is here that the future Patten Commission is envisaged which has led to 
a number of changes to policing in Northern Ireland. A section on prisoners follows 
that outlines the two governments’ scheme for the release of prisoners connected to 
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paramilitary organizations that abide by ceasefires. The last section, “Validation, 
Implementation and Review”, relates to the process of implementation of the BA and 
the roles of the governments, the participants, and the institutions set up in this 
process. It also outlines the procedures for reviewing aspects of the Agreement. Last 
but not least, the Irish and the British governments agree to sign the new BIA, 
replacing the AIA from 1985. This new agreement is annexed to the BA, and likewise 
the BA is to be an annex in this agreement. Here the governments recognize what the 
parties have agreed to in the BA (or the “Multi-Party Agreement” as they call it) and 
agree to the earlier mentioned text on constitutional issues, to support and where 
appropriate implement the provisions of the BA and to take the legislative steps 
required by the Agreement. 
4.2 Taylor’s Critique and the Agreement 
In the introduction, Taylor’s (2006:217) starting point was introduced: The BA, “as a 
consociational settlement, rests on and promotes an ethno-national group-based 
understanding of politics that is inherently illiberal – with the result that space for a 
more deliberative form of democracy around a common citizenship agenda is 
foreclosed”. Furthermore, he was not mainly concerned with problems of 
implementation, but rather “processes integral to consociational politics that are 
inimical to liberal democracy”. And he thinks that the BA “accepts and legitimates the 
two ethno-national communities – unionist and nationalist – reading of the conflict 
and seeks to promote a form of politics that treats them as fixed, autonomous and 
equally valid” (Taylor 2006:218).  
In his critique, Taylor (ibid.) has a “list” of aspects that he claims “can be shown to 
have worked to encourage and reward those who pursue strategic ethno-national 
group calculations and interests – and to have thereby reinforced and politicized 
ethno-national group divisions – in ways that run counter to promoting liberal 
politics”. These are: “group designation in the Assembly”, “executive formation”, 
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“and the electoral system”, all of which are parts of the BA that have contributed to 
labeling it as a consociational agreement. I first turn to presenting these arrangements 
more in detail before turning to the charges leveled against them. 
Group Designation or Community Designation 
The first aspect Taylor (2006:218) uses in his argument is the use of “group 
designation” in the Assembly (BA 1998: Strand One). Group designation takes the 
form of every elected Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) stating his or her 
political identity as “unionist”, “nationalist” or “other” at the first meeting the 
Assembly holds. This designation serves as the basis for special voting procedures 
that come into play for all decisions that are “key decisions”. The special voting 
procedures are that of “parallel consent” and “weighted majority”. The former entails 
that a key decision must be supported by a majority overall and a majority of both 
unionist and nationalist designations to be passed. The latter requires a 60 per cent 
overall majority and at least 40 per cent in favor within both the nationalist and the 
unionist bloc. Some decisions, such as “election of the Chair of the Assembly, the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations” are 
defined in advance by the BA as “key decisions”, but any 30 members can trigger the 
special voting procedures to be applied to any decision. This aspect is clearly 
consociational as it embodies the principle of “mutual veto” (Lijphart 1977:36-8). 
Involuntary Coalition or Grand Coalition and Proportionality  
The next feature on Taylor’s (2006:219) “list” is the manner in which the parties are 
entitled to ministerial power in the Executive based on their proportion of MLA’s in 
the Assembly (BA 1998: Strand One). He calls it “involuntary coalition”. The 
Executive is led jointly by the FM and the DFM elected on a cross-community basis 
with up to ten ministers responsible for a department that together with the FM and 
the DFM then constitute the Executive Committee. The ministerial posts are allocated 
proportionally to the parties based on their number of seats in the Assembly by means 
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of the d’Hondt formula.20
The Electoral System – Proportional Representation with Single Transferable 
Vote (PR-STV) 
 This aspect of the BA relates to and can be seen as 
interpretations of two classical consociational features, namely that of “grand 
coalition” and that of “proportionality” (Lijphart 1977:25-36 and 38-41). 
Taylor (2006:219) is also critical of the specific type of electoral system that is used 
in elections to the Assembly, PR-STV (BA 1998: Strand One). The most important 
thing to note is that this is one possible system for following the consociational 
recommendation of proportionality because the outcome due to the number of 
candidates to be elected from each constituency is more proportionate in relation to 
people’s votes than a winner takes all system with only one candidate elected from 
each constituency. Tonge (2006:174) remarks that generally, “STV produces a highly 
proportional result”. More specifically, PR-STV in Northern Ireland entails that from 
eighteen different constituencies (the already existing Westminster constituencies) six 
MLA’s are to be elected (Mitchell 2001:31). Voters do not choose party lists, but rank 
individual candidates in line with their preferences. To be elected, a candidate needs 
14.3 per cent of the vote, what is often referred to as “the Droop Quota” (O’Leary 
2001:57). The special feature of STV-systems is that a candidate does not have to 
reach the quota on first preferences in order to be elected. The superfluous votes of 
successful candidates are transferred to other candidates in accordance with the 
voter’s lower preferred candidates. This process goes on until six candidates are 
elected. 
Criticisms of the Three Consociational Aspects 
Taylor (2006:218-19) holds that the veto, provided for the two main groups through 
group designation and the special voting procedures, “locks individual politicians into 
group thinking” and that it amounts to unequal rights because those who designate 
                                              
20 This entails that one divides votes, or in this case MLA’s for each party, by the divisors 1,2,3,4 and so on until all 
ministerial posts are filled, and the party with the highest coefficient at any time is entitled to the next ministerial post. The 
most common alternative to d’Hondt is Sainte-Lagüe’s formula, which starts out with the divisor 1.4 (Elklit 1997:284). 
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themselves as “other” do not “carry meaningful weight” when it comes to key 
decisions. National identities are privileged over individual identities, he claims. He 
uses an example from 2001 when three Alliance Party MLA’s temporarily changed 
designation from “other” to “unionist” in order to secure sufficient support for the 
institutions under the Agreement. By doing this, they were forced to “’lie’ about their 
self-identity” for politics to continue in Northern Ireland. 
The form executive formation takes in the BA is criticized by Taylor (2006:219) 
because it has proved to be unsuccessful in building the collective character that 
executive bodies are meant to have. He sees it as “sharing out power without 
collective cabinet responsibility”. Taylor is concerned that an executive thus formed 
insulates itself from “effective opposition” and censure, and that ministerial 
accountability becomes a problem due to party elites assigning themselves “spheres of 
ministerial control”. The result is that the Executive becomes “’a series of political 
silos loosely connected by weekly meetings’”. He sees politics at the executive level 
as less about power sharing and more of a competition for ministerial power to be 
used for asserting the rights of the respective communities that the parties represent. 
Furthermore, Taylor believes that PR-STV has not been effective in regards to have a 
moderating influence on politics in Northern Ireland and that tactical voting across 
community lines has not been significantly encouraged by this system. He rather sees 
evidence of a strengthening of “communal bloc voting” and points to the electoral 
success of the radical parties (Sinn Fein and DUP) on each side of the divide at the 
expense of the moderate parties (UUP and SDLP) and the non-aligned (APNI and the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition). 
Summing up the charges against these three consociational arrangements, Taylor 
(2006:220) sees them as privileging “the ‘natural’ pre-given ethno-national group 
categories” and a kind of politics that is about winning and losing for the respective 
communities. He claims that the principle of an individual right to freedom of 
association is violated because not only are there categories of “unionist” and 
 64 
“nationalist”, the category of “other” becomes a group designation due to the 
impossibility of exiting from group designation as such. 
Non-Consociational Aspects Criticized 
Taylor (2006:220-2) is also concerned with, and treats similarly to the three 
consociational features, two additional aspects that cannot easily or at least directly be 
attributed to or identified as recommendations from classical consociational theory. 
These are the BA’s solution to the constitutional question, which I will loosely label 
as the aspect of “self-determination”, and that of the BA’s “equality agenda”. 
The Constitutional Question – The BA and Self-Determination 
Under the telling heading “Constitutional Issues”, the BA (1998:2-4) includes 
commitments from the British and Irish governments which the Northern Irish parties 
endorse related to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Here, what has been 
called the “principle of consent” is stated and defined. The two governments 
“recognize that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement 
between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their 
right of self-determination on the basis of consent”, meaning a majority in both 
jurisdictions. Northern Ireland’s place in the Union is in other words made contingent 
on the wishes of the majority of its people (and that of the Republic), as both 
governments pledge to bring forth legislation to bring effect to the wish of the 
majority should it change from the current pro-Union majority. Furthermore, it is 
affirmed that regardless of which government that at any time exercises sovereign 
power over Northern Ireland, this government will exercise its power “with rigorous 
impartiality on behalf of all the people”. For instance, it is a right regardless of 
constitutional status that the people of Northern Ireland can identify and “be accepted 
as Irish or British, or both” and as a result can hold either citizenship or both. Draft 
legislation to make these commitments come into effect is attached; perhaps the most 
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famous of these being the Irish government’s proposed changes to Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Irish Constitution,21
Taylor on the BA and Self-Determination/the Constitutional Question 
 a practical step in recognizing the principle of consent. 
Taylor (2006:221-23) holds that the BA as such is hostile to deliberative politics 
because it encourages bargaining based on fixed group interests. He is also critical of 
the role that elites, that is the two governments with US support and Northern Ireland 
party leaderships, played in predetermining the ethno-national character of the 
problem addressed. Taylor sees the two referenda as not being evidence of “wide 
ranging deliberation in the civic public sphere”, but rather as addressing an elite-level 
bargain sold by “spin-doctoring and obstructionism”. The point of introducing this 
general criticism is that Taylor sees the handling of the constitutional question as a 
prime example of foreclosing deliberative politics. His objection is that the 
mechanism of majority decision to determine the question of sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland posed as a single-choice option ignores wider trends regarding 
national sovereignty. Taylor points to increased “global interconnectedness” as having 
reduced the significance of national sovereignty and borders generally, and that in 
Northern Ireland specifically, “the importance and capacity of central government 
involvement is being put into question, with governance becoming multilevel and 
multiform”. Also, he suggests that rather than posing a single question to be decided 
by majority vote, a common citizenship agenda should be sought through democratic 
deliberation because it is a better method for resolving important and/or seemingly 
intractable political questions. Taylor sees the role of civil society as potentially 
constructive to promote social integration and beneficial to the advance of democracy, 
but sees the BA as not having contributed to positive developments in this regard. 
                                              
21 The changes to the Constitution that the Republic’s electorate endorsed in the referendum signified a change from 
defining Northern Ireland as part of the “national territory” to one of an aspiration for Irish unity (Coakley 2001:235).  
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The Equality Agenda – Group Based? 
The final feature I will present that Taylor (2006:220-1) sees as problematic is what 
he calls “the equality agenda”. In order to understand this properly, the criticism is 
introduced together with the aspects that fit under this heading. His main problem 
with these arrangements is that they tie “equality to group membership” and that they 
are “unambiguously couched in the language of ‘two communities’”. The features he 
has in mind are: “anti discrimination legislation and public policies that advance 
‘mutual respect’ (such as governing the use of symbols and emblems) as well as 
‘parity of esteem’ for cultural difference (such as support for the Irish language)”. 
These aspects, according to Taylor, tie “equality to group membership”. This is not 
only problematic because it like other features of the BA seems to make “gains and 
losses assume zero-sum form amongst unionists and nationalists”. But also because 
“the idea that the ‘two communities’ can be treated equally flies in the face of prior 
acceptance of the conflict as being intractable”. “Equal recognition requires one to 
adopt a universal standard of value against which groups can be equally judged”, 
Taylor holds. He continues, “in any case, it is not even established that as to why 
ethno-national groups should be treated equally – after all, and the history of Northern 
Ireland bears this out, some might be oppressive”.  
Taylor (2006:221) specifically points to a paragraph from the BA in arguing how the 
Agreement ties equality to group membership. Under the previously mentioned 
section on human rights, the BA (1998:17, para. 4) invites the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission:  
to consult and to advise on the scope of defining, in Westminster 
legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention 
of Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern 
Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and 
experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual 
respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of 
esteem, and – taken together with the ECHR – to constitute a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the 
Commission will be: 
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• the formulation of a general obligation on government and 
public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of 
treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern 
Ireland; and 
• a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against 
and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private 
sectors. 
Taylor’s Conclusion 
Taylor (2006:223) concludes his critique by claiming that the BA “is hardly ‘the 
product of an imaginative consensus of the citizen’s autonomous wills’”, but that this 
is precisely the standard that should apply to the future of Northern Ireland. He holds 
that seeing it as a given fact that the conflict is about irreconcilable ethno-national 
interest is not progressive in light of his belief that “the social world is created and 
constructed by the debates that we have about it” and not “simply tied to the ‘nature 
of things’”. Taylor thinks that consociational politics is being less respected and 
people are disengaging from it in Northern Ireland, and he cites poll data that suggest 
that 35 per cent count themselves outside the categories of unionism and nationalism. 
Also, he sees signs of deliberation emerging among “’hardliners’” in the loyalist and 
republican camps. 
Taylor welcomes a deliberative approach to Northern Ireland politics and believes it 
would promote understanding, toleration, broader perspectives and public-spirited 
attitudes. Deliberation would in itself encourage people to express their interests in 
“public interest terms”. He suggests “deliberative opinion polling, citizens’ panels and 
juries, public issue forums, and multi-option electronic referendums” as appropriate 
initiatives. Furthermore, he wants the BA to be succeeded by a ”’Deliberation Day’”, 
a “civic holiday” where people could meet in smaller and larger groups to deliberate 
on issues of concern, and thus “enable citizens to forge a common destiny”. Taylor 
suggests that one of the tasks for such deliberation would be to design the framework 
for a “constitutional convention” similar to Philadelphia in 1787. Here, elected 
delegates would meet “to determine the future form of government”. The relevant 
question to ask would be: “’What is good for the political future of us all?’” 
 68 
4.3 Evaluation of the Agreement 
I start out with a general reply to three broad themes in Taylor’s critique. The first 
theme is the belief that deliberation is a better solution to the conflict than the BA 
which is charged with being hostile to the deliberative ideal. Second, deliberation 
should be held around “a common citizenship agenda”, and third, the BA accepts and 
legitimates the ethno-national character of the conflict. My response to these themes 
forms an important background for how I then approach the evaluation of the 
particular institutions of the BA and the corresponding criticisms. In this evaluation, I 
start out with the three consociational features before turning to the question of self-
determination and the equality agenda. Following these sections, I try to challenge the 
BA from the point of view of a few selected alternative solutions. In the final chapter, 
a conclusion that sums up the evaluation is made. I hold the Agreement as a whole to 
be an honorable compromise that does not warrant claims of illiberality.  
A General Challenge to Taylor’s Critique 
A main part of Taylor’s argument is that deliberative politics would in some sense 
provide a better solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, and that the BA is a 
settlement that works against such virtuous practice envisioned in the deliberative 
ideal. I do agree that deliberation is a positive ideal for political processes. From 
around 1990 the deliberative ideal has gained popularity among theorists at the 
expense of “’vote-centric’” or “’aggregative’” models of democracy. In other words, 
the view that democracy is about a procedure of how to make fixed individual 
preferences translate into public decisions has been challenged by a model which 
argues that democratic legitimacy also requires public debate where persuasion, 
reason-giving, development of consensus or alternatively formulations of honorable 
compromises are integral parts of the political process (Kymlicka 2002:290-91).  
I believe that such ideals alone do not provide the answer to what just institutions 
look like in the Northern Ireland or any other context as seen from a liberal 
perspective. The reason is that, and most deliberative democrats agree on this, 
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“consensus is at best a happy but occasional by-product of deliberation, not its 
presupposition or goal – deliberating about our differences is not the same as 
eliminating our differences”. Therefore, even deliberative democrats cannot do 
without a procedure for voting and elections to decide those issues where 
disagreement remains even after deliberation (Kymlicka 2002:292). It is a weakness 
in Taylor’s argument that he does not provide specific alternatives in terms of such 
procedures in his argument. The BA must be judged not only on its effects on 
deliberative politics, but also on how it as an institutional structure positions citizens 
when it comes to decisions where no consensus is reached. 
A related problem that the Northern Ireland case provides for Taylor’s approach is his 
call to deliberation around “a common citizenship agenda”. In this, he simply 
disregards the question of what citizenship this refers to and which people are to 
participate in this deliberation. Democracy does not give a clear cut answer to the 
drawing of political boundaries (Kymlicka 1995b:1), and thus to who belongs to a 
political community. The case interpretation demonstrated that political boundaries 
and conflicting claims of self-determination are central to the Northern Ireland 
conflict, and that partition of the island became the solution, although a contested one. 
One cannot ignore this background by simply telling people to deliberate around a 
common citizenship agenda. At the heart of the dispute in Northern Ireland lays a 
disagreement on what the relevant constituency is that should be entitled to decide on 
the border. A decision must be made on who the relevant people are who should 
determine this (Canovan 1996:17) and according to which procedures. The BA 
answers these questions; something I believe is an achievement in itself. These 
answers must of course be evaluated, but a critique that does not address these 
underlying issues does not give plausible reasons to reject the Agreement. The 
purpose of much normative political argument, as referred to earlier, is often aimed at 
choosing the best alternative available at the time of decision. A forceful challenge to 
any set of political institutions must therefore provide better and plausible 
alternatives. 
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When it comes to the critique of how the BA can be said to accept and legitimate the 
ethno-national character of the conflict, it is necessary to refer back to the case 
interpretation and the remarks made on how especially national identities give rise to 
considerations of minority rights in liberal theory. As became clear in the case 
interpretation, an important part of the conflict concerns the resulting relations 
between two dominant ethnic groups after the partition of Ireland. The ethnic markers 
of Protestant and Catholic translate into a pattern of adversarial identities in terms of 
politics and nationality. From a liberal perspective I have argued that it is 
unreasonable to demand from individuals to give up their national identity or culture, 
and that people’s autonomy depends on access to a secure societal culture. I cannot 
therefore follow Taylor in what I see as an attempt to wish away the fact that people 
in Northern Ireland hold different national and political identities. If a minority is 
disadvantaged in a political community in terms of access to their preferred societal 
culture, then compensatory measures must be considered which aim at rectifying this 
inequality in circumstance. These measures, however, must not result in the restriction 
of freedom for members of the minority in the name of protecting a culture, but rather 
be remedies that put members of the minority on equal footing with the majority in 
terms of having a fruitful context of choice and a secure sense of self-identity. This 
was presented earlier as a distinction of internal restrictions versus external 
protections, the latter being the liberal approach to minority rights. In the following 
evaluation, the general responses of this section form an important background when 
responding to Taylor’s critique and assessing the BA. 
4.3.1 Evaluation of the Three Consociational Features 
The three consociational features of the BA in focus here are distinct institutional 
solutions, yet closely linked in terms of what they express in terms of democratic 
institutional approach. Therefore, the following evaluation includes both arguments 
that apply to all of them and arguments related specifically to each institution. 
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Grand Coalition – the Executive Committee 
The grand coalition, which the Executive Committee in the BA is a variant of, is the 
most important characteristic of consociational democracy. This model is often 
contrasted with regimes where the government enjoys only bare majority support and 
has a large opposition in parliament (Lijphart 1977:25). The main argument relevant 
to Northern Ireland used to explain why plural societies generally should prefer a 
grand coalition constituting the executive branch of government is that some sort of 
grand coalition is the only institutional framework that guarantees that the minority is 
not permanently excluded from government. Such exclusion is the inevitable result of 
other institutional solutions in societies where there are two segmental parties or 
alliances of parties of unequal size (Lijphart 1977:30). The case interpretation made it 
clear that exclusion was exactly what happened in Northern Ireland and the effects of 
a permanent one-party unionist and Protestant regime were not only securing the 
societal culture of the majority, but arguably also discrimination and inequality for 
those not part of the dominant group.  
Access to one’s preferred societal culture and this culture’s chances of being a fruitful 
context of choice, require the political power to control or affect political decisions. 
An inclusive approach to executive power, securing the representation of both 
national groups, thus seems to represent the only democratic solution to guarantee 
such political influence for the minority. The majority will always have its interests 
protected under democratic institutions. The minority, however, is in cases like 
Northern Ireland dependent on institutions that do not permanently exclude them from 
power.  
In terms of democratic values generally, it is a perfectly legitimate view that as many 
people as possible rather than just a majority should be involved in governing and 
have their interests responded to (Lijphart 1999:1-2). It can of course be argued that a 
government versus opposition model is not exclusionary in itself because in many 
societies majorities and minorities change (Lijphart 1977:29). But in societies like 
Northern Ireland where this has not happened so far and is not likely to change in the 
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foreseeable future, it seems obvious that one should opt for a model that does not 
permanently exclude a minority as long as that model is equally acceptable from a 
democratic point of view.  
The arrangements concerning executive power in the BA arguably also contribute to 
the self-respect of Catholic and nationalist people in Northern Ireland, an important 
precondition for any individual to pursue her life projects with confidence. Under the 
current regime both Sinn Fein and the SDLP have been secured ministerial posts due 
to the entitlement to such positions of parties reaching a certain number of MLA’s 
rather than a system of government versus opposition where minimum winning 
coalitions often occur. The system also guarantees a nationalist to be elected as DFM 
(given the procedure of election and the electoral strength historically and at present 
of the two nationalist parties). The self-respect argument is no small point considering 
the effects of majority rule by one single party from 1921-72. No Catholic held a 
cabinet post until 1968 (no nationalist did before the BA) and the only piece of 
legislation passed initiated by a nationalist in the Northern Ireland parliament was the 
Wild Birds Act in 1931 (McGarry 2004:328). One should remember that an important 
rationale behind the creation of the Northern Ireland state was to secure a permanent 
majority of Protestants within its borders. As I see it, executive power for both the 
unionist and nationalist political tradition is one among several features in the 
Agreement that breaks with the tradition of Northern Ireland being an exclusively 
Protestant and unionist state. Having a stake in the top tier of that state’s institutions 
should not be underestimated as a contributor to self-respect in addition to the more 
practical necessity of access to political influence. 
In response to the criticism that the Executive Committee lacks the collective 
character that executive bodies are meant to have, I question whether any 
substantially different institutional arrangement could secure such collective character 
without inevitably resulting in the exclusion of the minority national group. There is 
much to be said for how the Agreement in addition to ensuring that executive power 
is shared by the representatives of the two national communities, or indeed 
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representatives of any political movement with a certain degree of electoral support, 
has provisions for accountability and scrutiny of ministers without the threat of 
excluding parties that have substantial popular support. Through the “Pledge of 
Office” which all ministers must take (BA 1998: Strand One, para. 23; Strand One, 
Annex A), they commit to: using only peaceful and democratic means, serving 
everyone in Northern Ireland equally, participating in preparing a program for 
government, operating within that program when it has been agreed to by both the 
Executive Committee and the Assembly, “and to support, and act in accordance with, 
all decisions of the Executive Committee and Assembly”. Also, a minister can be 
removed from office by the Assembly through voting on a cross-community basis 
(BA 1998: Strand One, para. 25). Furthermore, although not formally part of the 
Agreement, the Assembly has instituted a practice of not letting the chairs of 
Assembly committees be drawn from the same party as the minister responsible for 
the corresponding area of policy (Adshead and Tonge 2009:41). There are then 
clearly provisions for collective and individual responsibility for ministers, however, 
within a framework of guaranteeing a permanent place for all political traditions 
receiving sufficient popular support. 
Group or Community Designation 
What the system of group designation does together with the special voting 
procedures is in reality to provide a veto (as defined by the procedures of “parallel 
consent” or “weighted majority”) on certain decisions first and foremost for 
nationalist MLAs, but also for unionists in the event that nationalists and others would 
constitute a majority. There is nothing inherently illiberal in demanding more than a 
simple majority for making important political decisions. Indeed, an important part of 
liberal morality is to protect certain interests of individuals from majority decisions 
altogether. Why else would it be a defining feature of liberalism, as earlier outlined, to 
give priority to certain rights, liberties and opportunities? Again, it is also a perfectly 
legitimate view of democracy that as many people as possible rather than just a 
majority should be involved in governing and have their interests responded to and it 
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breaks with the tradition of one-party and one tradition domination of Northern 
Ireland politics. 
I do not share Taylor’s concern that this system locks politicians into group thinking. 
Rather than locking politicians into group thinking, it can be argued that the presence 
of such a veto power provides a “feeling of security” because it together with the 
grand coalition amounts to “a complete guarantee of political protection” of one’s 
interests. Such security is arguably an incentive to be concerned with the welfare of 
the entire political community because the veto makes it unnecessary to be overly 
concerned with a struggle for “ascendancy” (Lijphart 1977:36-7). I think it is a basic 
good for Northern Ireland society that the minority of today can feel secure as a 
minority and that if demographical or other changes lead to a new majority, a similar 
system should be held in place to ensure the security of that minority as well. It simply 
takes away the anxiety of relying on numerical superiority to have one’s national 
group protected.  
On a related note, Brendan O’Leary (2004a:367) has argued that a logic of “’double 
protection’” should be advocated, meaning that the type of protection enjoyed by 
northern nationalists under the BA should also apply to British unionists in the event 
of a future united Ireland. He believes this is an idea that the Agreement does not 
preclude. I agree, and believe that the BA’s (1998:2) commitment to “rigorous 
impartiality” and “parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, 
ethos, and aspirations of both communities” regardless of which government that has 
jurisdiction, demonstrates the support for the double protection logic. It should 
perhaps, however, have been articulated more clearly in the text what institutional 
arrangements that would ensure this commitment. 
Community Designation and “Others” 
The critique Taylor makes in regards to the possibly problematic role the group 
designation system assigns to the group of “other” and that it specifies the two other 
relevant designations as “unionist” and “nationalist” is one that I do not want to 
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dismiss easily. Nevertheless, I do not see how the BA could do without a mechanism 
that requires more than a 50 per cent majority for important decisions made by the 
Assembly. The record of unrestrained majority rule in Northern Ireland is too 
problematic for that to be an acceptable solution. However, both McGarry (2004:343) 
and Tonge (2005:147), who in general are supportive of the Agreement, have 
expressed a preference for scrapping the community designation system in favor of a 
system that simply requires 60 (McGarry) or 65 (Tonge) per cent majorities for 
important decisions. This would perhaps serve the purpose of protecting the 
nationalist minority of today and a possible unionist minority of tomorrow (McGarry 
ibid.) while avoiding the naming of groups with special veto rights.  
I am not convinced that Northern Ireland in the present would be served well by 
allowing key decisions to be made with for example all unionists and others and only 
a small percentage of nationalist MLAs voting in favor, even if this amounts to 60 or 
65 per cent of MLAs. As argued, Northern Ireland was created to at least allow for 
the political dominance of one tradition, a dominance that disadvantaged first and 
foremost an ethnic group (Catholics) which to a large degree is comprised of 
individuals with a different national and political identity (Irish and nationalist) than 
the majority. The advantage of community designation is that it secures political 
influence for both national traditions, something which cannot be guaranteed even by 
demanding supermajorities for important decisions. I think community designation 
can be defended on liberal contractual grounds because the burden this system can be 
said to assign to those individuals who are neither unionist nor nationalist does not by 
any means outweigh the legitimate benefits it provides individuals who are 
nationalist. An important premise in arguing this point is to show that Taylor’s claim 
that the BA violates the individual right of freedom of association is patently false, 
and that the institutions of the Agreement do not privilege pre-given ethno-national 
group categories. 
First of all, all votes in the Assembly are counted equally regardless of the MLAs 
communal designation and most decisions only require ordinary majorities. Even 
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when the special voting procedures come into play, an overall majority (parallel 
consent) or 60 per cent (weighted majority) is needed in addition to a majority or 40 
per cent of unionists and nationalists. In other words, the group of “others” is far from 
excluded from the democratic process. The system of communal designation would of 
course be perverse if it allowed small minorities to block any decision supported by 
an overwhelming majority, but this is clearly not the case in Northern Ireland. It rather 
secures meaningful influence for a large minority.  
As the previous chapter noted, the parties who represent unionism and nationalism 
regularly poll between 80 and 90 per cent. The average percentage of MLAs who 
designate themselves “other” has been 7 per cent after the Assembly elections of 
1998, 2003 and 2007. While there is a trend that unionist and nationalist parties have 
increased their dominance at the expense of other parties, this trend preceded the 
institutions of the BA (Tonge 2005:256). The Agreement cannot therefore be seen as 
causing this development. This rather suggests that most people in Northern Ireland 
see the politics of unionism and nationalism as essential to their political preferences 
irrespective of the current institutional regime. The last remark also points the 
attention to the electoral system. I think the use of PR-STV is relevant when 
discussing whether the system of community designation is justifiable, and it is of 
course due a general evaluation of its own as a consociational feature of the BA. 
PR-STV and Community Designation and PR-STV in General  
I submit that PR-STV as a proportional system of elections gives people the best 
conditions possible under which to let their genuine political preferences decide their 
vote rather than tactical considerations. Having elections conducted through 
proportional representation not only ensures minority representation, it also permits 
the segments in society to define themselves (Lijphart 1995:281). In other words, it 
does not favor unionist or nationalist or any other kind of parties. Neither does any 
other electoral system provide a lower threshold for any political preference to gain 
representation. Indeed, McGarry (2004:343) holds that “voters in Assembly elections 
are less likely than are voters in Westminster elections to consider voting for a new 
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party a waste of time”. The overall effects of PR-STV elections in Northern Ireland 
have in practice shown to give a picture “of high proportionality” (Adshead and 
Tonge 2009:110). Given that unionist and nationalist parties thoroughly dominate 
under such a system, it must be taken as an indicator of the importance of unionism 
and nationalism to most people in Northern Ireland. The minority veto through group 
designation therefore seems as an appropriate arrangement under the circumstances to 
secure political influence for individuals of both the majority and minority national 
group. It should be perceived as an arrangement to protect the interest in access to a 
societal culture that people feel attached to and have a legitimate interest in holding 
on to. In practice, community designation simply ensures that important decisions 
have majority support in addition to substantial support from the two national groups 
which most people identify with as expressed freely through the ballot box. 
It is interesting that Taylor criticizes the electoral system of PR-STV for its lack of 
moderating influence and the strengthening of communal bloc voting. I have already 
pointed to how PR-STV has proved to yield highly proportional results and that it is a 
system that does not favor any particular political party or ideology, but is rather a 
facilitator of minority representation and provides favorable conditions for the 
emergence of new parties. It is hard to see Taylor’s criticism as anything but an 
expression of dissatisfaction with the outcome of Northern Ireland elections rather 
than a criticism that can be said to undermine the liberal credentials of the system 
itself. I believe a system which does nothing to favor any particular outcome is very 
much in line with a liberal outlook on politics. Individuals are given no other 
incentives to decide their vote than their own judgment on what candidate and party 
they believe best further and represent their interests. 
Finally, I believe there are reasons to modify Taylor’s claim that PR-STV has lacked a 
moderating influence. The system can facilitate moderation within political parties. In 
Northern Ireland this has clearly been the case with Sinn Fein. Before the Peace 
Process, the party received almost no lower preference transfers from SDLP voters. 
After the party moved away from advocating violence as a legitimate political 
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strategy and joined the constitutional political process, it has not only surged in first 
preference votes, but also become the natural second choice for SDLP voters 
(Adshead and Tonge 2009:118). One could also argue that the DUP also has 
moderated itself, going from outright opposition to the BA, to leading the Executive 
Committee jointly with Sinn Fein and participating in all-Ireland structures. The 
current hegemony of the traditional “extremes”, Sinne Fein and DUP, cannot 
therefore be seen as an unequivocal expression of lack of moderation in Northern 
Ireland politics under PR-STV. 
4.3.2 Evaluation of the BA and Self-Determination 
It is a challenge to provide clear-cut answers to whether the BA’s handling of self-
determination and the constitutional question is liberal. Buchanan (2003:231) has 
noted that political theory in general, including liberal accounts, “has remarkably little 
to say about the ethics of creating and changing boundaries”, but at the same time, 
“which side of a boundary people find themselves on can have profound 
consequences for their freedom, their welfare, their identity, and even their survival”. 
It is a dilemma that important interests are at stake for individuals while liberal 
theory, and even democracy itself as noted above, does not give a kind of 
unambiguous moral guidance one could have wished for. 
While there are good reasons to be critical of the precise manner in which the 
Northern Ireland state was created, other forms of partition, the retention of the whole 
of Ireland in the UK, or a united Ireland are all answers to political boundaries that 
could have been or can be criticized for similar reasons. An entire project could be 
devoted to scrutinizing the pros and cons of these and perhaps other possible 
boundary and sovereignty arrangements, but I very much doubt that one of them could 
be proven superior to all others through drawing on democratic and/or liberal theory. I 
have no better strategy than simply look at what the BA provides in terms of answers 
to the question of self-determination and judge them through the lenses of individual 
autonomy and equality in the Northern Ireland context. This strategy acknowledges 
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that the question of political boundaries is important in terms of impact on the 
interests of individuals while it is realistic in terms of how clear an answer theory can 
provide. 
The Principle of Consent and the Irish Dimension 
The BA (1998:2) speaks of a right to self-determination “for the people of the island 
of Ireland alone”. However, cementing the principle of consent through defining the 
two jurisdictions that are to exercise this right through referenda is clearly a 
recognition and accommodation of an important unionist demand. The Union is 
secure as long as political preferences and demography remain roughly unchanged in 
Northern Ireland. Instead of “Irish self-determination”, Tonge (2005:47) has 
suggested the term “partial codetermination”, reflecting Northern Ireland’s self-
standing right to decide on its own constitutional future under the agreed procedure 
regardless of the result of any vote in the Irish Republic. As previously argued, under 
democratic institutions the societal culture of individuals belonging to the majority is 
secure simply in effect of their majority status. I think this fact was acknowledged by 
the Irish and British governments and can explain why it was recognized by policy 
makers on both sides that an “’Irish dimension’” had to be part of the BA. This 
dimension had to “reflect the identity of northern nationalists and acknowledge, via 
institutional means, the desire of the majority of the people of the island for Irish 
unity” (ibid.). It is the various measures under the Irish dimension in the Agreement 
that I think balance the principle of consent’s favoring of unionists and can go a long 
way in meeting Taylor’s critique of the BA’s handling of the constitutional question. 
In short, I will argue that there are features of the Agreement that do not ignore trends 
regarding national sovereignty, but rather employ them creatively in its institutions. 
And using the language of liberal egalitarianism, I hold that many of the arrangements 
supplementing the principle of consent aim at rectifying inequalities this principle 
results in. Inequalities of circumstance are addressed and sought compensated for 
through the Irish dimension and a focus on bi-nationalism generally. 
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Since the principle of consent secures Northern Ireland’s place in the Union and the 
majority position of British unionism for the foreseeable future, it becomes necessary 
to assess how other political institutions address the inevitable disadvantages this 
principle causes individuals who are neither British nor unionist. The consociational 
features already discussed are of course important because they secure political 
influence for those belonging to the minority. In addition, however, the BA (1998:2) 
recognizes the equal legitimacy of the political aspiration of a united Ireland to that of 
unionism, as well as noting specifically that in Northern Ireland it is a right to identify 
oneself “and be accepted as Irish or British, or both”, which includes the right to hold 
both citizenships. These are clearly provisions of symbolical importance that break 
with the tradition of Northern Ireland as an exclusively Protestant and unionist state, 
and they are arguably contributing to the self-respect of those who see themselves as 
Irish and/or nationalist. 
On a more practical political level, the establishment of the North/South Ministerial 
Council is another step in the direction of making Northern Ireland less exclusively 
British by bringing an all-Ireland dimension to Northern Ireland politics. O’Leary 
(2004b:272-3) describes the Council as creating “a new confederal relationship that is 
all-Ireland in nature”. The relationship is confederal because it involves the voluntary 
delegation of powers and functions from separate sovereign jurisdictions, and it 
therefore falls well short of a form of a federal united Ireland or British-Irish joint 
sovereignty. It nevertheless represents an all-Ireland dimension to Northern Ireland 
politics. Adshead and Tonge (2009:192) sum up some of the practical results of the 
NSMC’s role in all-island cooperation. Under the remit of the NSMC, six new cross-
border implementation bodies were established. The policy areas they represented 
were food safety, inland waterways, trade and business development, language, 
aquaculture and marine matters, and special EU programs. Also, cooperation was 
agreed regarding agriculture, education, environment, transport, health and tourism. 
To give an idea of the extent of all-Ireland cooperation, numbers from 2005 can be 
cited. That year saw 846 million Euros spent on all-island activity. National programs 
accounted for nearly half of this, but 37 per cent was through North-South bodies and 
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the areas of cooperation agreed to in the BA. The rest was provided through EU 
programs. 
The NSMC and all-Ireland cooperation in general clearly modify the force of Taylor’s 
charge that the BA ignores trends regarding national sovereignty, and it provides 
more practical solutions to accommodating disagreements about the border than the 
vague call to deliberation around a common citizenship agenda. There are few 
reasons to believe that national sovereignty any time soon will cease to be the primary 
organizing principle of world politics, and thus the question of boundaries and 
sovereignty has to be agreed in some manner also regarding Northern Ireland. The 
principle of consent is one such agreement. What the BA does is to accommodate, 
through drawing on the opportunities that trends in national sovereignty provide, 
those that lose out on their primary preference regarding the jurisdiction they want to 
be under. While Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future remains securely in the 
Union with Great Britain, the Agreement secures an all-Ireland dimension through the 
NSMC. The importance of this all-Ireland dimension in the Agreement is 
demonstrated on the very first page of it. Here, the participants not only commit to 
work for the success of all the institutions, but it is specifically noted that the 
Assembly and the Council are “so closely inter-related that the success of each 
depends on that of the other” (BA 1998:1, para. 5). 
The British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
Two other institutions are worth mentioning under the discussion of self-
determination and the approach to differing preferences on national sovereignty. The 
BIC, whose inclusion in the BA was strongly advocated by unionists (Tonge 
2002:188), provides a forum for bringing together the British and Irish governments 
as well as representatives of devolved institutions in the UK. This brought an 
“East/West balance” in the Agreement against the NSMC and also reflected the need 
for a forum of the “post-devolution era” of the UK (Aughey 2005:91). In addition to 
balancing the all-Ireland aspects of the BA with a British dimension in the current 
circumstances, O’Leary (2001:62) has argued that the BIC can be seen as an 
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institution through which unionists could be provided a link to the UK in the event of 
Northern Ireland becoming a part of the Irish Republic. As I see it, the BIC is 
therefore another feature of the Agreement that provides current and possibly future 
modification to an either/or logic of national sovereignty, accommodating and 
reflecting the diverse identities that people in Northern Ireland hold. 
Finally, the BIIC can be seen as another way in which the minority national group is 
secured a connection to its preferred nation state in that the Irish government has a 
consultative role in all non-devolved matters regarding Northern Ireland. As referred 
to above, the special interest of the Irish government in Northern Ireland is 
acknowledged in the text of the BA. This feature is not new, as it resembles the right 
of consultation granted under the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, and it falls far short 
of joint sovereignty, but it is remarkable in the sense that no other foreign government 
has been “granted such privileges over London policy-makers within their own 
jurisdiction since the Danegeld was paid” (O’Leary 2004c:223). Indeed, from the 
early seventies, it became clear that an institutionalized role for the Irish government 
would have to be included in any deal for nationalists in Northern Ireland to enter 
talks (O’Kane 2007:4). 
A Liberal Approach to Self-Determination  
Overall, I believe there are good reasons to label the BA’s approach to self-
determination as liberal. It is realistic in the sense that it provides a concrete answer to 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the terms under which it can be 
changed rather than avoid the question by referring to deliberation with no 
institutional specifics. However, the Agreement supplements the principle of consent 
with institutions that address the fact that the political boundaries this principle 
cements for the foreseeable future, results in a national majority and a significant 
national minority. As I have argued, it would be unreasonable to demand someone to 
give up their national identity. It is rather a legitimate interest to hold one’s preferred 
identity and be guaranteed access to a secure national culture. Furthermore, I think it 
is reasonable to view the fact that people end up as part of a majority or minority 
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nation due to the drawing of political boundaries as a result of circumstance and not 
their own individual choice. The institutions discussed in this section should be seen 
as addressing the inequality in circumstance that the political entity of Northern 
Ireland entails for its citizens and contributors to their self-respect. While one might 
argue that joint sovereignty between Britain and Ireland would provide the most 
equitable solution between the national groups in terms of accommodating conflicting 
national aspirations, this would be a solution that has no support among unionists and 
would require a very complex set of political institutions (Tonge 2002:202). The 
strength of the BA is its wide support among people from many traditions combined 
with giving institutional recognition and expression to Northern Ireland as Irish as 
well as British both in the current context and if one in the future sees a change in 
constitutional status.    
4.3.3 Evaluation of the Equality Agenda 
Taylor is critical of measures often referred to as the equality agenda in the BA 
because he believes them to tie equality to group membership. On this issue I think it 
is essential to note all those aspects of the Agreement that deal with equality through a 
strengthened focus on individual human rights without any reference to group 
membership, as well evaluating those particular features Taylor is concerned with. It 
is therefore worth restating some of the contents from the brief overview earlier 
presented. The BA (1998:16-18) is clear in affirming for “everyone in the 
community” (importantly not for the two communities) civil rights and religious 
liberties, and affirms in particular a number of individual rights as listed above 
because of the history of conflict. The incorporation of the ECHR also fits under this 
individual rights heading. In sum, this has undoubtedly strengthened the focus and 
protection of individual human rights for people in Northern Ireland. It is a clearly 
liberal development because it conforms to the principle of giving priority to the types 
of rights needed for people to hold, form, revise and reflect on conceptions of the 
good even if other concerns conflict. I think McGarry (2004:342) makes a sensible 
judgment on the BA’s equality measures when seen as a total package in that they not 
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only stress “equality (‘parity of esteem’) between nationalists and unionists”, they also 
offer protection to all individuals, including those that do not identify with the two 
main political traditions. A prime example in addition to those aspects just referred to 
is the obligation on all ministers through the “Pledge of Office” (BA 1998:10), “to 
serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the 
general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination”. 
When it comes to the parts of the equality agenda which Taylor criticizes for tying 
equality to group membership, I think it is important first to note that none of them 
amounts to what has been referred to as internal restrictions. Neither anti-
discrimination legislation nor policies to advance mutual respect, as exemplified by a 
focus on how symbols and emblems are used, can plausibly be said to restrict any 
individual’s freedom when it comes to leading the life she believes to be good. As I 
have presented in some detail earlier, discrimination of the minority group was a 
feature of the Northern Ireland state. Such discrimination affected individuals, but it 
did so on the basis of their group identity and its position in a Protestant and unionist 
dominated state. That anti-discrimination legislation and policies address and 
recognize both injustices that can befall all individuals due to various aspects of their 
lives and the historic legacy of discrimination against Catholics in particular is in my 
view a sensible approach to the Northern Ireland case. The idea is liberal, as it tackles 
the issue of discrimination of individuals through recognizing the circumstances that 
lead to such discrimination. One such “circumstance” has undoubtedly been the 
simple fact of belonging to the Catholic minority. As an illustration of the many 
aspects the Agreement counts as relevant in anti-discrimination, a few examples can 
be cited. The BA (1998:16) recognizes “the right to equal opportunity in all social and 
economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity”. And the 
British government makes it a priority “to create a statutory obligation on public 
authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the 
need to promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; 
gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation”. In 
regards to employment in particular, the legacy of the past is also duly recognized as 
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the British government commits to “a range of measures aimed at combating 
unemployment and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates 
between the two communities by targeting objective need” (BA 1998:19). In sum, the 
BA addresses all sources of inequality that is commonly associated with 
discrimination generally and that of the particular position of Catholics in the state 
historically. I submit that this is in line with the liberal principle of not holding people 
responsible for the circumstances they find themselves in, and that permissible 
inequalities are only those that result from people’s genuinely free choices. 
A Bill of Rights 
At the time of writing there is still no agreement reached on a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland, so it is hard to evaluate this non-existent feature apart from the 
general encouragement formulated in the BA of such a Bill of Rights “to reflect the 
principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both community and parity 
of esteem”. O’Leary (2004b:270) is positive to the principle of such a Bill of Rights 
supplementing the ECHR because the ECHR “is weak on the protection of collective 
rights and equality rights” and there is a need for protecting “both national groupings 
as well as individuals”. While I agree with O’Leary, I would make more explicit the 
grounding of equality measures regarding the communities in the interest of 
individuals. It is individuals who suffer in their ability to pursue the good life with 
confidence when their national/ethnic group is attributed an inferior status. “Parity of 
esteem” and “mutual respect” between the “two communities” must be understood 
and justified on this background. O’Leary (ibid.) acclaims the BA as making Northern 
Ireland “bi-national” and breaking with previous beliefs that stability and democracy 
could be achieved through an either British or Irish Northern Ireland. While it in my 
opinion is debatable whether Northern Ireland is fully bi-national as long as joint 
sovereignty between Britain and Ireland is not the constitutional arrangement in place, 
the BA clearly modifies a traditional either/or approach to territorial sovereignty. 
Parity of esteem and mutual respect are concepts in the BA that contribute to this. 
They seek to eliminate the difference in standing between groups and thus serve the 
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individuals who identify with either of these through securing the self-confidence of 
British and Irish alike. For a liberal this should be an important concern.  
The Irish Language 
In regards to the Irish language, the BA’s response is that of provisions within the 
field of education, general protections and public use of the language, similar to 
arrangement regarding Welsh in the UK. What this amounts to is linguistic protection 
for an important part of Irish nationalist culture (ibid.). Languages which are not 
public languages tend to become marginalized to the extent of becoming used only by 
a small elite or only in a ritualized form rather than “as a living and developing 
language underlying a flourishing culture (Kymlicka 1995a:78). The modest measures 
of the BA seem justified as a response to keeping the Irish language as precisely such 
a living and developing language underlying Irish nationalist culture. To deny 
protections for this minority language would amount to not taking seriously the 
legitimate interest people have in access to a rich culture (their own), which in turn 
contributes to the development of each individual’s capacity for a conception of the 
good. This does not tie equality to group membership. It rather secures individuals 
part of a linguistic minority an opportunity to at least partly have the same 
opportunities in terms of language as the majority language group already has. 
4.3.4 Alternatives to the Belfast Agreement 
Finally, before making a comprehensive conclusion regarding the liberal credentials 
of the Agreement it is necessary to consider briefly some alternative solutions to the 
conflict. Political argument often amounts to choosing among alternatives based on 
the best arguments available at the time of decision, and I also believe that such a 
review of other possible scenarios can contribute to a strengthening of the defense of 
the BA. I think Tonge (2002:199-206) has succeeded in identifying those options that 
are at least theoretically viable alternative institutional approaches to the Northern 
Ireland conflict. These are: restoring direct rule, full integration of Northern Ireland 
into the UK, a united Ireland, joint authority between Britain and Ireland, European 
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authority over Northern Ireland, devolution and power-sharing without the cross-
border institutions, repartitioning of Northern Ireland, and finally an independent 
Northern Ireland. 
What the Alternatives Lack 
There is one important argument that should count in favor of the BA which concerns 
all the alternatives listed above and which does not require one to scrutinize any of the 
specific institutional solutions provided by the other arrangements. Whyte (1990:242-
3) doubted whether it would be possible to find a single solution that could be 
implemented for the whole of Northern Ireland due to the great variety of situations 
within its borders. He pointed to the staunchly republican and nationalist south 
Armagh, the “happily unionist” north Down, and Buckley’s Upper Tullagh where 
unionists and nationalists live side by side without the level of conflict found in other 
areas. The problem as Whyte (ibid.) saw it, was that Northern Ireland consisted of all 
these three kinds of places, “and every conceivable variety of situation in between”. 
Seen through the lenses of the pessimism expressed only eight years prior to the 
Agreement reached at the multi-party talks in Belfast, the BA emerges as a 
considerable achievement despite the problems in implementation that followed it. 
Today, all major political parties work within the framework of the BA’s institutions, 
and only small and marginalized groups continue to use violence as part of a political 
strategy. To paraphrase Whyte, the BA is a solution that works fairly well for north 
Down as well as south Armagh. 
Assessing the Alternatives 
Having noted the significant advantage the BA has as a settlement that enjoys 
widespread support, or at least acceptance and compliance, and as I have argued 
above, being justifiable from a liberal point of view, it is still worthwhile considering 
the merits of other approaches. The least promising or desirable alternatives from the 
list above are: the restoration of direct rule, repartitioning, and an independent 
Northern Ireland.  
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Direct rule by London was exercised for most of the time between 1972 and 1998 
through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with little influence being granted 
to even Northern Ireland Members of the Westminster Parliament. Local authorities 
were stripped of responsibility in many areas, a removal of powers that “owed much 
to the association of those bodies with sectarian discrimination (Tonge 2002:77). On 
the positive side, this period “saw the abolition of much of the overt discrimination 
against the Nationalist population”, but a problem with relying on this mechanism 
today is of course that no political group wants indefinite direct rule (Tonge 
2002:200). In addition to the lack of support among politicians, I think it would be 
hard to defend the bypassing of Northern Ireland politicians regarding the affairs of 
their own polity from a liberal and democratic point of view. The process of 
devolution in the UK after 1997 which saw the establishment of parliaments for 
Scotland and Wales (and Northern Ireland), can only serve to make direct rule seem 
even more of a paternalistic and undemocratic approach to governing. 
Repartitioning of Northern Ireland is a strategy that does not provide any institutional 
alternative as such to the BA. In doing so, one would of course aim at having as many 
people as possible being included in their preferred jurisdiction. If successful, one 
could perhaps rely on political institutions that did not have to take into account the 
existence of majority and minority groups. The problem with Northern Ireland is that 
the antagonistic communities do not live neatly divided for any new arrangements to 
achieve the desired result without relying on very long and straggling borders and 
even detached enclaves (Whyte 1990:227). Tonge (2002:205) attributes to these 
practical difficulties the fact that repartition has never been considered a credible 
solution to Northern Ireland’s problems. With this in mind, one should rather focus on 
solutions that address and accommodate the legitimate interests of the individuals 
who are part of the multi-national polity of Northern Ireland. The idea of an 
independent Northern Ireland is like repartition not a complete institutional alternative 
to the BA and support for it is very limited across the ethnic divide. In 2000 it stood at 
8 per cent (Fahey, Hayes and Sinnottt (2006:90). For these two reasons it does not 
warrant any further consideration here. 
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European Authority 
Tonge (2002:202) defines the European authority scenario as a Northern Ireland that 
is not exclusively British or Irish, but rather a region within a federal Europe where 
the citizens adopt a European identity. In this category, one might perhaps also put the 
SDLP proposal from 1991-2, where it was suggested that Northern Ireland should be 
governed by an executive modeled on the European Commission. Three members 
were to be elected from Northern Ireland, three appointed by Britain and Ireland each, 
as well as three by the Commission (McGarry and O’Leary 1995:281). The idea 
seems in any case to aim at making Northern Ireland less exclusively British while 
avoiding the other “extreme” of an exclusively Irish state. The problems with this 
solution are nevertheless considerable. A Europe of regions might be emerging seen 
from a perspective of economic cooperation, but in political terms this seems a distant 
prospect (Tonge 2005:185). As I have earlier stressed, individuals have a legitimate 
interest in keeping the bond to their preferred societal culture, often represented by a 
national identity, and it would therefore be unreasonable to demand a transfer to a 
European identity. The voluntary transition to a European identity replacing national 
identities is not a likely scenario. Research shows that national identity by far 
dominates over European identity in the self-perceptions of people in Europe 
(Bellamy 2006:248). Overall, it does not seem warranted to claim that an enhanced 
role for the EU can provide an alternative to the BA. And one should remember that a 
limited European dimension is already part of the Agreement in “Strand Two”, in that 
the NSMC is a forum for considering matters in relation to the EU and that one of the 
suggested areas for North/South cooperation and implementation are relevant EU-
programs (BA 1998:11 and 13). 
A United Ireland 
A united Ireland is the ultimate goal of Irish nationalists and republicans. The BA 
provides an agreed procedure for how this aspiration can become a reality. Assessing 
a united Ireland as a solution to the conflict is an entirely different matter. The 
implementation of a united Ireland in the current context means overriding the wishes 
of the majority of people in Northern Ireland and especially those of the Protestant 
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community. One could argue that this would conform to the wishes of the majority on 
the island of Ireland and even in Great Britain (Tonge 2002:201), but ultimately this 
leads us to the dilemma earlier discussed of deciding on the appropriate unit of self-
determination. I find it highly irresponsible to advocate a united Ireland in any other 
way than through the procedures of the BA. These have been agreed to by the British 
and Irish governments, unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, and a 
majority of people in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Earlier I discussed 
extensively the deeply held hostility of the Protestant and unionist community of 
being incorporated into a united Ireland and the measures they historically have been 
willing to use to avoid this when confronted with such a prospect. I also warned 
against dismissing these preferences as merely manipulation of that community’s best 
interest. The historic fact that a substantial part of unionism has agreed to let the 
constitutional future of their state be subject to referendum and to participate in all-
Ireland political institutions is an achievement that should not be put in jeopardy.   
Joint Authority 
Joint authority between Britain and Ireland is the institutional arrangement that I 
personally favor as the theoretically fairest solution for Northern Ireland. It was 
forwarded in a report from the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4 where the SDLP, 
Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour (Irish) participated. Joint authority was proposed 
together with two other alternatives, a unitary united Ireland and a federal/confederal 
state (Whyte 1990:138-40). My support for this idea from a theoretical point of view 
rests on its equal accommodation of the two national groups Northern Ireland has. No 
other institutional arrangement could better embody a principle of equality between 
that of being British or Irish in Northern Ireland. The state would have a 
constitutional status which contributed equally to the self-respect of individuals 
regardless of their national identity, and the “circumstance” of which side of the 
border one would find oneself would cease to have such relevance. However, the 
reason why I qualify my support for joint authority as merely theoretically based is the 
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already mentioned challenge of lack of unionist support and the complexity of the 
institutions required to implement the arrangement. 
Devolution without Power-Sharing 
Devolution in Northern Ireland based on power-sharing, but without the cross-border 
institutions, amounts to a solution which recognizes the problems of a history of 
political domination for only one tradition while diminishing the relevance of what 
was referred to as the Irish dimension above. It is an arrangement that has been 
widely supported among unionist politicians, especially in the DUP, while nationalists 
have expressed little enthusiasm for any settlement that does not include institutions 
that transcend the current border (Tonge 2002:205-6). In addition to the practical 
obstacle of a settlement that would be rejected by a sizeable portion of the citizenry, 
there is a significant moral argument in favor of the external dimensions of the BA 
supplementing the internal consociation. Both the all-Ireland institutions of the 
Agreement and the institutions linking the two islands provide symbolic and practical 
recognition of the fact that Northern Ireland, whether it stays in the Union or becomes 
part of a united Ireland, consists of two distinct national and ethnic groups whose 
members largely disagree on which state they prefer to belong to. Given the fact of 
significant opposition to joint authority and a recognition that the dominant 
organizing principle of the world’s states for the foreseeable future is sovereign states, 
the cross-border institutions of the BA provide a link for the current national minority 
as well as the possible future national minority to its preferred nation state. Removing 
such institutions from any settlement for Northern Ireland would amount to 
dismissing the legitimate interest people have in the standing of their own national 
group. 
Integration into the United Kingdom 
In Under Siege. Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Arthur Aughey 
(1989:202-209) argued for full integration of Northern Ireland into the UK as the 
proper solution to the conflict. His claim was partly based on a view on the modern 
state as unavoidably multi-national and that the advantage of the modern state is that 
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it can create unity among people who have nothing in common except the state itself. 
If only, according to Aughey, the normal democratic principles of Britain were fully 
implemented in Northern Ireland, “equal citizenship within the United Kingdom”, 
things would improve. People could keep their national allegiances in a cultural sense, 
but still remain British citizens as this simply would entail membership in a polity that 
embraces pluralism. In contrast, Aughey describes the Irish Republic as a state that 
embodies the idea of Irish nationalism exclusively. The first things to be done, he 
continues, is to give the people in Northern Ireland the opportunity to vote for the 
major British parties in order to gain the possibility of actually having a say on who is 
to form their government. And in general they should be given “greater access to 
mainstream British politics”. This would counteract tendencies towards political 
alienation simply by giving people a greater say in the issues that affect their lives. 
Such political equality should also be followed by measures to give everyone in 
Northern Ireland equal opportunities in social and economic areas as well, Aughey 
argued. 
I do not wish to engage in a debate on whether or not the UK is a polity that embraces 
pluralism, nor if the Republic fits the unfavorable description attributed to it above. 
The problem with Aughey’s argument and the idea of full integration into the UK in 
general is the notion that national identity somehow can be isolated from having 
relevance to political institutions. The concept seems to entail that as long as people 
can be culturally Irish or British, or any thing else for that matter, and that this is 
tolerated, it is not politically relevant in a multi-nation polity if only one form of 
citizenship is available or if no kind of political institutional recognition or 
accommodation is given to the minority nation(s). This argument ignores the effects 
on the self-respect of individuals that the standing of a national group inevitably has, 
and it ignores the very real disadvantages that have befallen those belonging to the 
Catholic minority which consists overwhelmingly of individuals with an Irish national 
identity.  
 93 
Whyte (1990:219) clearly saw that the nature of the communal division in Northern 
Ireland was different from those divisions found in the rest of the UK and that 
“special institutions” were needed and called for “to meet the contending needs and 
aspirations of its two communities”. “Nowhere else [in the UK] does one find the 
lethal mixture of a large minority with a well-founded and deeply felt sense of 
grievance, and a narrow majority with justifiable anxieties about what the future may 
hold”. After the establishment of devolved institutions in both Scotland and Wales as 
a response to the demands of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, it seems today even 
more inappropriate to try to integrate Northern Ireland closer into mainstream British 
politics while ignoring the political relevance of the identities people hold. The 
presence of adversarial national identities and the history of the Northern Ireland state 
in handling this reality should be sufficient rationale for rejecting settlements that 
place national identity in a cultural category removed from political relevance. 
Remarks on the BA and Its Alternatives 
This assessment of some of the most common alternatives that have been proposed by 
politicians and/or theorists has shown that none of them warrant the abandonment of 
the institutional structure the BA has provided as an answer to the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The alternatives either lack the support of being realistic settlements and/or 
are inferior from a normative point of view in addressing the morally relevant 
challenges the conflict raises. This strengthens the case for the Agreement. The BA 
seems to strike a good balance by being widely accepted and at the same time 
providing morally justifiable institutional answers. The relative peace and stability of 
Northern Ireland after the Agreement is of course an argument in itself for supporting 
it, but I would like to add the possibility that the success of the BA can also be 
attributed to it being perceived as legitimate by a substantial number of people in 
Northern Ireland. The defense of the Agreement which I have conducted through the 
lenses of modern liberal theory has illustrated an approach which can contribute to 
make clearer why the BA should be viewed as a fair, legitimate and liberal settlement 
to a long and serious conflict. 
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5. Overall Conclusion and Final Remarks 
Part of the deliberative ideal is the brokering of honorable compromises when 
consensus cannot be reached. The Belfast Agreement can among other things be seen 
as a deliberative product of talks between historical enemies. Compromises have been 
made and concessions given. The result is an institutional structure that caters to a 
range of important needs and interests. This project has demonstrated that the 
Agreement can be justified through a normative approach firmly rooted in the 
tradition of modern liberalism. That the BA is normatively justifiable, has attracted 
widespread support and/or acceptance, and has brought relative peace to a deeply 
troubled society are all reasons that support labeling it an “honorable compromise”. 
And as I sought to demonstrate, it is an honorable compromise that safely can be 
called liberal. 
The institutions of the Agreement’s internal consociation have ensured that Catholics 
and nationalists are no longer permanently politically excluded, arguably a boost to 
the self-respect of the minority community. Individuals belonging to the minority 
have been given meaningful political power needed to put them on a more equal 
footing with the majority in terms of having access to a secure societal culture of their 
own choice. The rules on the formation of the Executive Committee together with the 
special voting procedures providing a minority veto amount to a complete protection 
of the interests of today’s minority and any future minority, thus taking away some of 
the anxiety associated with a struggle for ascendancy to enjoy such protection. 
Importantly, the institutions needed to secure equality and a fruitful context of choice 
for members of both national and ethnic groups, have not entailed putting undue 
burdens on those who identify with neither of the main traditions or introducing 
illiberal measures that restrict the opportunity of any individual to form, hold, revise 
and pursue any view on the good life in the name of preserving a culture from change 
and/or decay. A proportional electoral system has ensured a low threshold for gaining 
political representation, and it provides an openness for new political movements and 
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interests to establish themselves should they win the allegiance of Northern Irish 
voters. No specific political agenda is favored by this system, it translates as faithfully 
as possible the interests expressed by individuals through the ballot box into 
representation. 
The Belfast Agreement answers the question of self determination through the agreed 
procedures of the principle of consent, but supplements it with institutions that 
acknowledge the need for an Irish dimension while Northern Ireland for the 
foreseeable future remains in the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A 
British-Irish dimension in the Agreement secures a British link for unionists even in 
the event of a united Ireland. These are solutions that draw their strength from the 
combination of being widely accepted and compensating members of the national 
group that loses out on their primary preference on sovereignty due to the 
circumstance of the specific sovereignty arrangement in place at any time. The 
arrangements go a long way in trying to live up to the liberal principle of 
compensating for circumstances people find themselves in through no choice of their 
own.  
The Agreement has strengthened the protection of classical individual rights central to 
liberal political morality. These are important to all individuals in Northern Ireland 
regardless of their national or political identity and to their right to hold, form and 
revise any particular conception of the good as long as it respects the equal status of 
others. At the same time, the BA has through its equality agenda also recognized 
additional measures needed to address and rectify inequalities that have befallen 
individual citizens in Northern Ireland as a result of ethnic or national group 
membership. The equality agenda does not, however, include any measures that 
restrict anyone’s right to pursue their preferred life projects based on their beliefs on 
value. On the contrary, it is acknowledged that it is important to individuals in their 
pursuit of a good life that their group identity and especially their national identity is 
not attributed an inferior status in their society and that it should not be allowed to be 
a source of discriminatory treatment. 
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As for the future, it is difficult to predict what lies ahead for Northern Ireland. The 
row in recent years over the devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly has threatened to once again bring down the institutions of the 
Belfast Agreement. However, on the 9th of March 2010, the Assembly voted by cross-
community consent to take responsibility for these powers. The leader of the Alliance 
Party, David Ford, was subsequently on the 12th of April confirmed as justice minister 
by the Assembly. It is perhaps a tribute to the institutions of the BA that old enemies 
now are willing to jointly take responsibility for a policy sector that involves some of 
the most divisive issues in Northern Ireland politics. I would like to think that the kind 
of liberal approach the Agreement represents has contributed to making such 
agreement possible. It rests on an idea that political institutions should aim at 
achieving equality among citizens and enable them to pursue their interest in leading a 
life that is good. For this to be possible in a society like Northern Ireland, one needs to 
recognize all the aspects of the circumstances people find themselves in and design 
institutions that do not disadvantage people for morally arbitrary reasons. One of the 
most important things the BA has realized is that it would be unreasonable to demand 
that people give up their national identity or fail to accommodate such identity if 
people choose to hold onto them. In this, societies in conflict elsewhere should look to 
Northern Ireland.   
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